The political shift to the right—towards authoritarianism, nationalism, misogyny, and hatred of queer people—is global and dates back to the 2008 crisis. Its main political effect was to deepen insecurity and awaken a “defensive” reflex, which in Europe was further exercised by the state budget crisis associated with austerity measures, the migration wave following the defeat of the Arab Spring, the pandemic, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Most recently, it has been the trade war with the US, along with prospects of a global recession. Contemporary reactionary politics has many common features, develops cross-border alliances, and raises similar issues. This doesn’t prevent its representatives from taking contradictory positions regarding relations with Israel, Russia, or China.
In individual countries, the form of the far right differs depending on local conditions and the forces that represent it.
In Slovakia’s case, this includes the Ľudáks [current taking inspiration from the WWII era pro-Nazi Slovak nationalists and their clerical successors], those who followed Marian Kotleba’s project of transforming neo-Nazi thugs into electable politicians, or the authoritarian current among neoliberal reformers from the early 2000s [the best representative of which is former Minister of Economy Richard Sulík]. The story also includes overseas and Russian interests that finance the crusade against “gender ideology” in Slovakia.
Today, however, the governing party Smer [Direction – Social Democracy, currently ruling populist party] is the key bearer of this development. We briefly described its trajectory in 2023. Meanwhile, the ideological differences between it and Hlas [Voice – a smaller social democratic party led by former Smer members] have been erased, with Hlas now in tow and Smer in the lead. The ranks of ideologues and advisers have also been sifted [Smer absorbed many smaller left currents and personalities, particularly the most opportunistic among them]. The messages of Premier Robert Fico’s “Slovak Social Democracy” today resonate among the working class. His party’s name is essentially sincere: it is a form of class compromise tailored to domestic material conditions.
Tentatively, more as a hypothesis, we can characterise the essence and origin of this compromise as follows. It seems that the export-oriented and unevenly developing Slovak economy created by foreign investments lacks internal impulses to drive its development. Weak trade unions cannot significantly push for wage growth, and there are no embryos of other, independent workers’ movements here. The country has no resources of its own that would allow it to pull itself up in the international division of labour. Externally, this effort is limited by competition, including competition for further investments.
At the political level, the dream of catching up with the West dissolved when the vision of a “two-speed” EU disappeared; at that time, Smer wanted to establish Slovakia as part of the so-called core. More recently, these factors have supported Smer’s sovereignist and nationalist reorientation. When it became clear that Slovakia’s precarious position in global value chains would not be so easily changed, it was necessary to make a virtue of necessity. Although this approach in practice cannot overcome the limits imposed by the country’s position, it certainly works ideologically. It builds on popular ideas about the “colonisation” of Slovakia by foreign capital, which are based on subjective experience with despotism in workplaces, but also on objective comparison of conditions with the West.
A natural complement to this orientation is protectionism in relation to the active part of the domestic workforce. The lowest strata of the reserve army, that is, Roma women and men, serve as a universally understood pretext for promoting the “targeting” of benefits. They can always be pulled out as a deterrent example: you don’t want to end up like them! Although the Slovak economy can no longer do without migrant labour from third countries, its influx is carefully regulated and migrants kept precarious via the framework of intermediary agencies.
In the background is some idea of an alternative development model: the economy remains open to capital, but otherwise relies on its own strength, so society does not have to worry about diversity and inclusion. The domestic class can thus pretend to itself that it is truly favoured, and that in an objectively disadvantageous situation, the maximum possible is being done for it.
In the conditions of a slim welfare state, which received its heaviest blows during the Dzurinda period [centre-right governments in 1998-2006], but for whose restoration Smer later did only the minimum, a large part of reproductive work lies on the shoulders of households—and especially women. Unstable and precarised immigration can fill gaps in industry, but the generational renewal of the workforce depends on domestic sources. Women’s employment is relatively high and accompanied by significant pay disparities compared to men. All this creates pressure to normalise the working family as a unit that can reproduce itself, with minimal state support, in increasingly uncertain conditions. As with Slovakia’s position in the international division of labour, Slovak social democracy makes a virtue of necessity here as well: we protect the family! The political expression of this effort is the rejection of the Istanbul Convention and heteronormative, and most recently cisnormative, constitutional amendments.
Marxist historian David Roediger showed that the “wages of whiteness” played a key role in the formation of the American working class. It was a set of non-material, that is, symbolic and psychological advantages, thanks to which white workers could think they were something more than Black workers. Even the worst-paid white person is still better off than any Black person because they are white! In reality, it was a poisoned apple that pacified whites, drove them into the embrace of capital, and made building class solidarity impossible.
In the conditions of stagnant “catching up” with the EU and real or threatened crises, Smer has managed to utilise various forms of class resentment, the roots of which go back to the period of economic transformation and the defeats of workers in the 1990s. Currently, the key themes of the far right—including in Slovakia—are family, gender, and gender identity. The coarseness and authoritarianism with which it has seized these themes correspond to its nationalism and xenophobia. The Slovak worker is now addressed from the May Day tribune as follows: “You are ours—and whatever happens, you will always be better than a Gypsy, a queer, a foreigner, or a woman.” This poisonous reward for masculinity must be rejected.
The Slovakian original of this article first appeared in Newsletter #64 of Karmína. This English translation, by Adam Novak, was first published on the website of Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières.