From Angola to Zambia to Uzbekistan: three emblematic cases reveal how China’s model of economic expansion is generating growing resistance around the world
Three emblematic cases highlight the predatory mechanisms of China’s model of global economic expansion, where infrastructure investment and commercial penetration are systematically accompanied by environmental degradation, violations of workers’ rights and growing hostility from local populations. The dramatic recent events in Angola and Zambia demonstrate how Beijing’s strategy, based on agreements with political elites and disregard for the needs of local populations, is generating a spiral of tensions that threatens the very sustainability of China’s presence on the African continent, while similar phenomena of resistance are also emerging in Central Asia, confirming the geographical extent of resentment across different continents.
Angola in chaos: anti-Chinese riots threaten social stability in Africa
China’s economic presence in Angola, built up over more than two decades of massive investment and strategic cooperation agreements, is facing its most serious crisis since the beginning of the new millennium. A violent wave of protests has transformed what initially appeared to be a normal taxi drivers’ strike against rising fuel prices into an explicitly anti-Chinese revolt that has shaken the foundations of Sino-Angolan cooperation. The ANATA union had organised a three-day protest against the government’s decision to increase petrol prices, but popular anger quickly turned against the most visible symbols of Beijing’s economic influence in the country. The streets of Luanda and the province of Malanje became the scene of a revolt that specifically targeted commercial and industrial activities run by Chinese citizens, revealing the deep resentment accumulated by the local population towards the Asian giant.
Popular fury struck Chinese economic interests with particular violence between July and August, transforming a social protest into a systematic attack on Beijing’s presence in Angola. Over ninety Chinese-owned shops were vandalised, while several factories had to immediately suspend production and close their doors for security reasons. The violence was particularly focused on retail chains. Images circulated online show terrified Chinese traders barricading themselves in their shops while angry mobs smash windows, loot goods and devastate the interiors of commercial premises. The violence reached such levels that entire industrial areas run by Chinese companies were brought to a standstill, with gates locked and production completely halted.
The escalation of violence triggered an unprecedented exodus of the Chinese community from Angola, causing one of Beijing’s largest diasporas on the African continent to flee. Thousands of Chinese citizens hastily left the country, causing scenes of panic at Luanda International Airport, where flights to China were completely sold out. The local Chinese community, estimated at between 250,000 and 300,000 people, experienced dramatic hours with many people forced to take refuge in guarded compounds or flee by land to neighbouring countries. Chinese embassies issued emergency warnings urging all compatriots to leave Angolan territory immediately. The final toll of at least five deaths and over 1,200 arrests testifies to the severity of a crisis that caught Beijing’s diplomatic strategy in Africa completely unprepared.
The Chinese model of economic penetration in Angola, built through the Belt and Road Initiative with $68.6 billion in loans disbursed between 2000 and 2021, is showing all its structural contradictions. Angola has become the main African beneficiary of the Chinese infrastructure project, which has financed the construction of roads, railways, hospitals and the new Dr. Antonio Agostinho Neto International Airport, considered the largest airport financed by China outside its national borders. However, this development has created a dual economic system where the benefits are concentrated in the hands of a small elite linked to Chinese interests, while the vast majority of the Angolan population remains excluded from the benefits of growth. The mechanism of debt repayment through oil exports has also created a structural dependency that is becoming unsustainable, especially since Beijing has redirected its energy imports to focus on Russia and the Middle East.
The incidents that have fuelled anti-Chinese resentment reveal a systematic pattern of unacceptable behaviour by Beijing-based companies in Angolan territory. In 2024, local authorities closed two Chinese factories for serious violations of national laws: a metal processing plant that operated without a licence and polluted a local river, and a plastics factory that kept 113 Angolan employees in inhumane working conditions, practically prisoners inside the factory. These scandals were compounded by protests by local fishermen against Chinese fishing vessels accused of devastating local fish stocks, and the recent government operation that led to the closure of 25 illegal cryptocurrency mining operations run by Chinese nationals, culminating in the expulsion of 60 people involved in activities banned for their impact on the fragile national electricity grid. These incidents have helped to cement China’s image as an extractive and predatory power rather than a partner capable of offering development.
The Angolan crisis marks a potential turning point for Chinese expansion in Africa, brutally highlighting the limitations of a strategy based exclusively on infrastructure investments and agreements with local political elites. For Beijing, which has made Angola a pillar of its presence on the African continent, the lesson is clear: soft power cannot be built by ignoring the social dynamics and expectations of local populations. The Sino-Angolan model, often presented as a virtuous example of South-South cooperation, has revealed its structural unsustainability in the face of popular anger. The events in Luanda could therefore trigger a chain reaction in other African countries where China’s presence generates similar tensions, creating a crisis for Beijing.
Zambia: when environmental disaster reveals the true face of Chinese investment
The Angolan crisis is not an isolated case in the complex relationship between China and Africa, as demonstrated by recent developments in Zambia, where an environmental disaster of catastrophic proportions has further highlighted the devastating effects of the Chinese investment model on the continent. In February, the partial collapse of a tailings dam at the Chinese state-owned copper mine Sino Metals Leach Zambia, near the city of Kitwe, released approximately 1.5 million tonnes of toxic waste laden with heavy metals, cyanide and concentrated acids into the environment. The scale of the disaster, initially underestimated by the authorities, turned out to be thirty times greater than initial estimates, with over 900,000 cubic metres of toxic waste continuing to contaminate the Kafue River basin, a vital artery for over 12 million Zambians who depend on its waters for fishing, agriculture and water supply. The case took on even more serious connotations with the discovery, a few days after the first accident, of a second leak of acid waste from another Chinese mine in the Zambian copper belt, whose operators had attempted to cover up the incident.
The legal and economic consequences of the disaster are taking on enormous proportions, with two law firms filing claims for a total of $420 million against the Chinese company. Drizit Environmental, initially commissioned by Sino Metals to assess the environmental impact, was dismissed after revealing the true extent of the disaster, while several embassies advised their citizens not to travel to the contaminated area due to serious health risks. The Zambian government, which initially attempted to downplay the threat, was forced to admit the presence of dangerous levels of heavy metals in the water samples analysed.
The Zambian incident represents a crucial test for China’s strategy in Africa, revealing how fragile the balance between economic dependence and environmental sustainability is in Sino-African relations. Zambia, which owes China at least $4.1 billion of its total foreign debt of $13 billion, finds itself in the difficult position of having to balance environmental criticism with the need to maintain Chinese investment flows that generate $260 million in taxes annually. Tension between Zambian workers and Chinese companies has a long history of violence, with incidents ranging from the 2010 shooting in which Chinese managers wounded 11 Zambian workers to the killing of a Chinese executive in 2012 by unpaid workers. Despite promises of greater social responsibility, Beijing has responded to the environmental disaster with a media strategy that emphasises humanitarian aid and new investments, such as $50,000 in donations for victims of recent floods and the announced investment of $1.4 billion to upgrade the Tanzania-Zambia railway, carefully avoiding any reference to the environmental disaster in the Chinese state media.
Uzbekistan: seized farmland and growing dependence on Beijing
Anti-Chinese tensions extend beyond Africa’s borders to Central Asia, where Uzbekistan experienced a coordinated media campaign in the first half of 2025 that revealed growing popular discontent with Beijing’s economic presence. The offensive was orchestrated mainly by figures from the Uzbek opposition in exile, with former imam Fazliddin Shahobiddin publishing accusatory videos from Turkey about the “sale of Uzbekistan to China”, while the YouTube channel Demokrat Uz broadcast content denouncing China’s “peaceful invasion”. Although the Uzbek government quickly denied the more specific allegations and described the entire campaign as “manipulation controlled by third parties”, the media coverage highlighted real concerns that had been smouldering among the local population for some time. Unlike the African cases characterised by spontaneous violence and environmental disasters, in Uzbekistan discontent manifested itself through an information war that nevertheless exposed the contradictions of the Chinese investment model in a country that is strategically crucial for the Belt and Road Initiative.
Behind the above campaigns lie concrete dynamics that reflect to some extent the patterns observed in Africa, with the substantial difference that the Uzbek government continues to actively protect its partnership with Beijing due to its economic dependence. Central Asia Barometer surveys document a collapse in positive perceptions of China from 70% in 2017 to 44% in 2023, coinciding with the explosion of Chinese investment following President Mirziyoyev’s opening up of the country in 2016. Concrete incidents have fuelled popular fears, such as the discovery in 2025 of the forced transfer of over 25,000 hectares of agricultural land to Chinese companies in the provinces of Andijan and Qashqararyo, which took place without official explanation and affected hundreds of farmers. The situation worsened when a local official in Samarkand was recorded threatening to “hand over the land to the Chinese” if the farmers were not more productive, fuelling suspicions of a systematic land acquisition plan.
The Uzbek case illustrates how the Chinese model of economic penetration is generating resistance even in contexts where local authorities maintain a façade of cooperation, demonstrating that the problem goes beyond individual incidents and touches on structural issues. China, which does not officially recognise the existence of anti-Chinese sentiment in Central Asia, has already had to adopt more sophisticated communication strategies in neighbouring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where dozens of anti-Chinese protests have taken place in recent years. The Uzbek phenomenon confirms that discontent with the Chinese presence is taking on global dimensions, involving different continents but with surprisingly similar dynamics of resource exploitation, concentration of benefits among local elites and exclusion of indigenous populations from the advantages of economic growth.
Andrea Ferrario is an Italian international politics blogger with a focus on East Asia. He has collaborated with the weekly magazine Internazionale and is co-editor of the website Crisi Globale.
The Italian original of this article was first published on the author’s Substack. This English translation was first published on the Left Renewal Blog.
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