Mediapart: In June, speaking before Danish comrades, you made a case for the idea of an “antifascist” foreign policy. Where are the hotbeds of contemporary fascism, in your view?
Li Andersson: One of the reasons I used that term is that the left, in much of Europe, tends to discuss war and peace in a way that ignores the ideological dimension of what is happening on the international stage.
We can have academic debates about the concept of fascism, but what matters is clearly identifying the similarity between the far-right ideology represented by Vladimir Putin and that represented by Donald Trump.
The United States and Russia certainly have specific geopolitical interests. But their leaders share a common ideology, not to mention economic interests that could align in Europe, and this creates new threats. We see this when the future of Ukrainian society is being negotiated between these two imperialist actors whose influence, in parallel, is strengthening the far right in European Union member states.
The left would be making a mistake if it too quickly forgets that in Ukraine, this is an imperialist attack led by an authoritarian far-right leader — and that this should factor into how one evaluates a situation of war or peace. A bad peace deal, one that would be a great victory for Putin and Trump, would have very serious political and ideological consequences for the European continent.
Have we entered a new era, and to what extent does this force the left to rethink its view of the world?
The world has changed in at least two ways. The first is a rebalancing of global power relations — what is called multipolarity. The second is the strengthening of the authoritarian mindset we just discussed, particularly in its far-right form.
In this regard, I regret that part of the left continues to focus its anti-imperialist discourse solely on the United States, with the reflexive thinking that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” — or at least not an adversary, since its power would at least help balance the blocs of global power.
This way of thinking is obsolete. First, because the international balance of power has already shifted away from US hegemony. Second, because geopolitical blocs are no longer clearly opposed to one another, as they were during the Cold War. Putin is more a friend of Trump than an enemy: if you are hostile to the latter, you have no reason to be complacent toward the former.
The similarities in how they speak about Europe are striking. Putin has long said that Europe is in decline because of its commitment to human rights and its abandonment of traditional values. Representatives of the Trump administration now use the same arguments, with a stronger emphasis on hostility toward immigration.
In the European Parliament, several of your colleagues — sometimes from your own group — do not hesitate to downplay the threat, arguing that Russian tanks will not be in Brussels, Paris, or Madrid anytime soon. What do you make of that?
When I emphasise far-right ideology, it is because it does not wait for foreign tanks to arrive before taking hold in a country.
Why is Viktor Orbán currently trying to push through even more restrictive laws against Hungarian civil society and free media? Why has Netanyahu been able to commit genocide in Gaza with impunity? Why does Erdoğan feel free to imprison leading opposition figures? Because major powers are reinforcing authoritarianism around the world.
Moreover, if you intend to develop left-wing policies at a European level, how would tanks in the east of the continent not concern you? If you are committed to the right to self-determination of all peoples and to the principles of international law, you should apply them consistently — whether it concerns US attacks on Iran or Venezuela, or Russian attacks on Georgia, Ukraine, and perhaps tomorrow Moldova.
In Finland, you were part of a coalition government led by Social Democrat Sanna Marin, from 2019 to 2023. That government joined NATO, with the support of the Left Alliance that you led. Why did you make that choice? And do you regret it now that Trump is back in the White House?
Much of the alternative left struggles to understand this position. When people here in Brussels talk about NATO, many equate it with the United States, which I understand. But after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, what was the most important issue we discussed in Finland? Not the United States, but the security guarantees we lacked.
Finland had a policy of military non-alignment, and Russia had just invaded a country that was also in a position of military non-alignment. Contrary to what I often hear, Ukraine’s prospects for NATO membership were very vague. What motivated Putin’s aggression was primarily the association agreement with the EU, because it consolidated ties with Europe that were pulling Ukraine away from the Russian sphere of influence.
From our point of view, it would have been preferable for some other framework than NATO to provide us with the security guarantees we were seeking. But no alternative institutional option was available. Looking back, I also believe the left in my country made a mistake by long opposing the development of an integrated European defence policy.
I do not regret that decision today. But Donald Trump is one of the strongest arguments for developing a European collective security system without the United States — which should have been the preferred solution for a long time. I call on the Western left to take seriously the desire of the eastern part of the European continent to benefit from such a system.
European states are currently playing a minor role in the diplomatic negotiations over Ukraine’s fate. How can they do better?
Europe must continue its military support for as long as Russian attacks continue. And if the United States were to further reduce its support, Europe should increase its own.
In addition to weapons deliveries, we are campaigning for the cancellation of Ukraine’s debt. A large portion of the aid granted to Ukraine has been in the form of loans. Repaying them will reduce the resources available for social policies and for addressing the housing crisis. Ukraine is fighting for its independence, not to be at the mercy of creditors.
Finally, European states and Ukraine should be more proactive in discussions about the possible and acceptable conditions for ending the war. Because if you do not engage with that question, you leave all the space to Trump.
I often tell my colleagues on the European left that the question of Ukraine will not disappear when hostilities end. And for that reason, I believe we must not once again make the mistake of leaving Ukraine in a grey zone between East and West. A membership perspective is one of the most important things the EU can offer at this moment.
That too is controversial within the European radical left…
The process would be easy for neither the EU nor Ukraine, but it would be a response to the growing ideological pressure exerted by Putin. Ukrainians know their country is not perfect, but their resistance expresses that they do not want to live under the same system as the Russian people currently do.
An interesting parallel can be drawn with what Finland went through at the beginning of the Second World War, when the Soviet Union invaded. Only two decades had passed since a Finnish civil war in which the working class and the bourgeoisie had fought each other. Yet they pushed back together against the invasion of their country. All the normal political divisions persisted, but the right to exist in their own homeland united them against the Soviets. I think we are witnessing something similar in Ukraine.
In France, Jean-Luc Mélenchon believes that “the war in Ukraine has been lost by the Europeans” and that “mutual security guarantees” must be negotiated. Do you agree?
Due to the language barrier, I cannot follow the French debate in all its nuances. What I can say is that we must understand what kind of leader Putin is, and remember the warnings from activists inside Russia who knew this long ago.
It was only when his worldview translated into attacks on other countries that many people woke up, across the political spectrum. And today, the right is making the same mistake with Trump, remaining silent about his authoritarianism as long as it only targets groups within the United States.
As for the specific idea of mutual security guarantees, it strikes me as somewhat absurd — or at least disconnected from the war of aggression we are witnessing. We all want the war to end. But the conditions under which it ends will matter.
You support the principle of rearmament, but not the way European states are currently pursuing it. What criteria would help avoid a drift toward militarism?
Having credible defence capabilities is important. This is what my party acknowledged in Finland, living next to an increasingly hostile and imperialist power. That means conducting a specific analysis for each country, and accepting potential increases in defence spending where they correspond to a genuine need.
But that is not what European states within NATO did when they agreed to a spending target expressed as a percentage of national wealth — 3.5% or 5% of GDP, depending on the method of calculation. That gesture was nothing more than an appeasement strategy toward Trump.
There lies a danger, because a large part of the right will simply push to spend as much as possible without discussing how it will be financed — which of course increases the likelihood of cuts to social spending and public services. And if you combine austerity for the population with rising military expenditure, you risk benefiting the internal allies of the very authoritarian leaders you claim to be defending against.
An antifascist foreign policy therefore requires a paradigm shift in economics. Military investment must not be set against other investments that are equally crucial from a security standpoint — in the welfare state or in the ecological transition. Similarly, an antifascist policy requires alliances with countries of the Global South to uphold multilateral institutions and international law. Something the EU has failed to do by remaining passive in the face of Netanyahu’s crimes.
You advocate reducing critical dependencies on authoritarian regimes, yet you abstained on the EDIP programme, which aims to build a “made in Europe” defence industrial base. Your group voted against. How do you explain that?
In the final compromise, there were provisions that weakened workers’ rights in a way that was unhelpful. That significant disappointment motivated my abstention. But in terms of the substance of the project, I support the idea that Europe should produce all of its defence capabilities without external dependence. The EDIP programme falls well short of that ambition, while still pointing in the right direction.
Within my group, some colleagues are concerned about the general militarisation of the EU. I share their view that spending intended for social and regional cohesion must absolutely not be diverted toward rearmament. What should unite us is the refusal to use European taxpayers’ money to finance the American military-industrial complex.
In France, the idea of voluntary military service divides the left. In Finland, military service is compulsory for men. What is your view on this?
The Left Alliance supports the system of universal conscription, because the alternative would be a professional army. The advantage of conscription is that it produces an army made up of ordinary people — and crucially, people from all social classes — rather than people who do it to earn a living.
An American left-wing professor once told me: “You have universal conscription in Finland. Make sure you keep it, because it is the only system that ensures political elites pay the same price for war as the working class.”
In countries with professional armies, you end up with working-class members serving in the military while elites have no need to join in order to find well-paid work.
The compulsory system therefore has advantages that a voluntary one does not. This is also the great injustice of the Finnish system: it is compulsory for men and voluntary for women, which is very outdated. Universal obligation would lead to managing a reserve too large for our infrastructure, but my party supports the principle of equal conscription for both sexes.
Li Andersson was a member of the Finnish Parliament from 2015 to 2024 and leader of the Left Alliance from 2016 to 2024. She is now a Member of the European Parliament.
The French original of this interview, conducted by Fabien Escalona, was originally published in Mediapart. This English translation, by Daniel Mang, was first published on the Left Renewal Blog.
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