This interview is based on Charlène Calderaro’s article Beyond Instrumentalization: Far-Right Women’s Appropriation of Feminism in France published in Politics & Gender (2025).
For readers less familiar with the French case, could you tell us a bit about Némésis which has made the news recently and which is the focus of your paper?
Némésis is a far-right women-only collective founded in Paris in 2019, which later expanded to French regions and French-speaking countries such as Belgium and Switzerland. Positioned within the wider identitarian movement and school of thought, the collective’s activists claim the label of “identitarian feminists”–an uncommon stance at the far-right. The collective first gained traction through social media platforms before achieving greater national visibility, partly via its president, Alice Cordier, who has been a regular guest on TV networks owned by far-right media mogul Vincent Bolloré–often referred to as the Bolloré empire.
The core of their discourse revolves around the racialisation of sexism, through which they attribute gender-based violence primarily to migrants and men from racially minoritised background – a key tenet of femonationalism. Némésis thus best exemplifies how femonationalism goes beyond far-right parties’ discourses and is actively enacted on the ground through social movements’ practices, led by young women themselves.
Their ideologidcal agenda is deeply rooted in ethno-differentialism, a key concept of the French New Right from the 1970s, which asserts the essential and immutable difference between ethno-cultural groups. This shift from biological racism to cultural racism allows them to frame gender equality as an inherent divide between cultural groups, reinforcing exclusionary narratives. What first struck me in their mobilisation was the focus on street harassment, a cause initially championed by feminist activists and the central theme of my fieldwork at the time. This stresses a broader pattern of far-right actors appropriating feminist themes and ideas to feed reactionary politics.
A key finding in your paper is that the far-right activists you researched differ from the traditional anti-feminism typically expected in these milieus. Could you tell us more about the concept of appropriation you develop and why it matters?
Instead of outright rejecting feminism, as has traditionally been the case at the far-right, these activists selectively adopt feminist themes–particularly those related to gender-based violence and women’s safety–while reshaping them to fit an exclusionary, far-right agendas. I analyse this process as an appropriation of feminism, which involves a selective adoption of feminist fights and ideas, and their subsequent transformation to align with far-right agendas. The broader aim is to relocate feminism at the far-right.
This perspective moves beyond the instrumentalisation thesis, which is often advanced to analyse the far-right’s growing engagement with gender issues, and tends to interpret it solely as a strategic move to appear more liberal and gain mainstream legitimacy. While this lens captures important dynamics, it often overemphasises strategic motives at the expense of examining the mechanisms through which far-right actors use and integrate gendered discourse into their political agenda. I believe it also overlooks the heterogeneity of far-right politics: while some segments engage in explicit antifeminist discourse, others blend feminist ideas with ethno-differentialist stances. As such, instrumentalisation offers a one-dimensional explanation to a complex phenomenon, obscuring the deeper ideological reconfigurations that may be at play around gender within the far-right. By conceptualising this process as appropriation rather than mere instrumentalisation, my aim was to highlight the broader political project of this segment of the far-right. Although these young women do use antifeminist frames and do instrumentalise feminist struggles, they also engage in a struggle over the frontiers of the feminist project, claiming a “far-right feminism”.
Importantly, analysing this process through the lens of appropriation allows for a broader perspective that does not isolate far-right discourse from wider political dynamics. It also stems from my observation that these far-right activists managed to appropriate feminism through the appropriation of a specific and contentious feminist issue: street harassment. In the French context, street harassment was publicly discussed as part of the 2018 criminalising law, with policymakers deploying racialised discourse, blaming street harassment on young racialised men living in working-class neighbourhoods. For the far-right to effectively appropriate this issue, it first had to be a site of contention between feminist activists–who initially championed it–and policymakers, who pushed for its criminalisation. This appropriation therefore rested upon a broader context of discursive and political opportunities, shaped both by the high salience of street harassment and its racialised framing by mainstream political actors.
Central to this new approach is a rejection of intersectionality. Why could this be seen as crucial in the mainstreaming process?
These far-right women’s rejection of intersectionality is a core part of their appropriation of feminism: they reject contemporary feminist movements, especially those that embrace intersectionality, while simultaneously adopting and reshaping the concept of feminism itself. This rejection of intersectionality is a crucial aspect of the mainstreaming process as attacks on intersectionality are not exclusive to the far-right but extends across a broader spectrum of political actors, particularly within the “anti-wokism” reactionary wave spreading across Europe. In France, intersectionality and critical race theory–which have only relatively recently made their way to French academia–faced severe criticism and attacks, including from members of the government under Macron’s presidency. This is best exemplified by the moral panic around so-called ‘islamo-gauchisme’ in 2020, fueled in part by government officials. When far-right activists, especially women, align with these critics based on similar rhetorics, they further normalise themselves, making their discourse resonate with more “mainstream” positions (which are more deeply embedded in a long republican colour-blind tradition).
A very similar mechanism occurred around the issue street harassment. To appropriate this feminist cause, Némésis activists not only rejected the feminist perspective on gender-based violence–which highlights structural gender inequalities–but also echoed the territorialised and racialisied framings already deployed by policymakers on street harassment. In doing so, they did not simply counter-frame feminist discourse, but they also strategically leveraged pre-existing frames used by mainstream political actors. This alignment gave their rhetoric greater legitimacy, as it resonated with more dominant narratives around nation, culture and identity.
This dynamic is also telling on the role of mainstream political actors in the far-right’s mainstreaming process, especially around gender. By framing certain feminist issues in a racialised way, policymakers and “femocrats” open up discursive and political opportunities for the far-right to position itself as not extreme, all while reinforcing exclusionary policies under the guise of mainstream concerns around women’s safety. The role of mainstream political actors in the current intensification of femonationalism in France is also well illustrated by recent statements of the current Home Office Minister, Bruno Retailleau, who praised Némésis and supported their participation to the traditional feminist march on March 8th, endorsing the collective’s narrative against feminists.
Engagement with far-right actors has been discussed at length in our webinar series on the Ethics of Researching the Far Right. Could you tell us about the challenges you have faced in your interviews and do you have any advice for researchers considering this approach?
My fieldwork with these far-right women activists was part of my wider PhD fieldwork, which also involved policymakers, feminist activists, and far-right men’s groups. My aim was to analyse how these actors converged around street harassment, how the issue circulated among them, and how it was gradually reframed to fit far-right political agendas. A key challenge was navigating between these different political actors, which required constant positional adjustments and significant emotional labour.
A substantial part of my fieldwork with far-right activists took place during the Covid-19 pandemic (via Zoom), which, in some way, helped maintain a certain distance from participants. While some of them were initially wary of answering my questions, most saw the interviews as opportunities for visibility, often equating research activities with journalism. My student status at the time seemed to foster trust–an observation already noted by other scholars on the far-right–alongside other factors, such as being white, which undeniably facilitates access.
The most difficult aspect was the emotional labour required as a sociologist engaging with so-called “ugly” movements, to borrow Tarrow’s notion. While I initially assumed interviews with these young far-right women would be much easier than those with their male counterparts, I quickly realised otherwise. Exchanging with young women who were displaying new forms of self-identification as both identitarian and feminist, and who were actively elaborating a project of a far-right feminism, was particularly unsettling. While difficult during the interviews–and the moments afterwards–it became particularly overwhelming during my long-term digital ethnography, where I followed their activities on social media platforms on a daily basis.
My advice, especially to PhD students, is to leverage their student status and emphasise the “exercise” dimension of their doctoral work to negotiate access. Most importantly, prioritising mental health is essential when doing qualitative fieldwork with the far-right. Before starting interview-based fieldwork, it’s crucial to be mentally prepared for discomfort and emotional strain. For those doing digital ethnography, taking regular breaks and setting clear limits on how much time you spend engaging with far-right content is key to avoiding burnout. I also strongly recommend building a support network, or at least connecting with a few colleagues who work on similarly challenging topics tied to reactionary politics. Personally, I tried to avoid overwhelming my personal environment with the racist discourses I encountered, being mindful of how much I disclosed when talking about my work. In this context, conversations with fellow colleagues researching the far-right became an essential source of emotional support–a space to process, share and reflect on our respective fieldwork experiences. Having that kind of space and solidarity makes a real difference.
Charlène Calderaro is a postdoctoral researcher in Sociology specialising in feminism, gender and far-right politics and a member of the RPRN. Her recently defended PhD thesis explores the appropriation of feminism by the far-right, focusing on the criminalisation of street harassment in Britain and France. She examines how this cause, initially championed by feminists, was reframed and appropriated by far-right actors in the French context. Through interviews and observations, her comparative research sheds light on how mainstream political actors may facilitate such appropriations, feeding into the normalisation of the far-right.
Originally published by the Reactionary Politics Research Network. Reproduced under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 licence.
More content from this blog
- Left Renewal Blog Seeking Co-editors
- Mussolini in Beijing, by Ho-fung Hung – 15 February 2023
- East Africa’s Authoritarian Turn – 25 July 2025
- The New Frontline. The US-China Battle for Control of Global Networks, by Ilias Alami, Jessica DiCarlo, Steve Rolf, Seth Schindler – 4 February 2025
- How MAGA-Inspired Politics Are Reshaping Japan and South Korea, by Eleonora Zocca – 4 February 2026
- Coloniality or Imperiality (in Eastern Europe, for Example), by Joseph Grim Feinberg – 3 April 2024