The Peace That Cannot Come, by Oleksandr Kyselov – 22 January 2026

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Russia appears unwilling to compromise in Ukraine – a problem ignored by those calling for an end to support for Kyiv

From analyse&kritik

For my grandparents, it took three years, ten months, two weeks, and three days of horror and sacrifice from the moment the first bombs fell on Belarusian and Ukrainian cities till the aggressor capitulated. Today, the war that Russia is waging in our country is about to enter its fifth year with neither victory nor defeat in sight. Nearly 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory is already occupied, but less than one percent of that was gained in the last year.

To the relief of many peace enthusiasts, Kyiv’s efforts have shifted toward seeking diplomatic solutions, with European capitals following suit. Yet as Trump’s deadlines have passed, the deal remains nowhere closer. Optimistic claims that 95 percent of terms are agreed upon, with only a few thorny questions left, make one wonder how this differs from the infamous Istanbul communiqué, which »almost brought us peace« but was similarly full of deferred disagreements.

Negotiations now revolve primarily around the positions of Ukraine and its allies, with those of the US, which in turn holds talks with Russia. The latest proposals maintain symbolic figures – an 800,000-strong domestic army, Article 5-like guarantees valid until Ukraine fires on Russian territory unprovoked – while leaving control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and territorial concessions unresolved. Kyiv agreed to presidential elections and even suggested a referendum to validate the peace agreement, provided an armistice would make them possible. All in vain: after a phone call, both Putin and Trump agreed that an immediate ceasefire would only prolong the conflict.

All of Russia’s foreign actions have long been subordinated to one goal: the subjugation of Ukraine, which has become an idée fixe.

In the meantime, Russia continues »solving the problems by military means«. Early January strikes at energy infrastructure caused total blackouts in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, leaving nearly 800,000 without electricity as temperatures dropped well below zero. Then the power was cut to over 500,000 in Kyiv. Moscow even fired a nuclear-capable hypersonic Oreshnik ballistic missile that reportedly hit an underground gas storage near the Polish border.

Russia’s Idée Fixe

Andriy Movchan argues in Counterpunch that many severely underestimate the ideological component of the Kremlin’s invasion. All of Russia’s foreign actions have long been subordinated to one goal: the subjugation of Ukraine, which has become an idée fixe. If this cannot be achieved militarily now, Russia will embed conditions in any peace process that allow it to continue under more favorable circumstances. Preventing the recurrence of aggression is key for both Ukraine and European security.

This explains Moscow’s harsh reaction even to cautious discussion of possibly deploying multinational forces in Ukraine: of limited size, only after a comprehensive ceasefire, away from the contact line, and if nothing endangers their safety. The Kremlin perceives any potential hindrance as a threat to its ambitions and warns that any such units and facilities will be treated as legitimate military targets.

If Russia were indeed looking for compromise in good faith, a hypothetical international police mission in a demilitarised neutral zone along the entire contact line could lift the siege from Kherson, ensure freedom of navigation on the Dnipro, secure the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, reinstate access to Pokrovsk’s coking coal mines, allow refugees to return, and physically separate the forces. Unlike military formations, such a mission could focus on civilian protection and monitoring rather than force projection. It could even allow Moscow to declare victory: no NATO troops in Ukraine, a buffer zone secures »the people of Donbas«, their land link to Crimea is maintained, while EU accession obliges Kyiv to respect minority rights and equips them with grievance mechanisms. The fact that nothing alike is even considered is further evidence that all these are no more than excuses.

At the Defense Ministry meeting in December 2025, Putin was explicit: Russia would »unconditionally« achieve its war aims and »liberate its historic lands«, predicting European »little pigs« backing Kyiv would eventually lose power.

The Peace Wing

The spokespeople of Peace from Below, Alexei Sakhnin and Lisa Smirnova, also dismiss in Jacobin the idea that Putin seeks an amicable settlement. Russia’s regime goals are to crush Ukraine completely, leaving it defenceless and in political turmoil, to justify the costs of the »special military operation« and to avoid any possible future threats. Yet they believe that a genuine call for immediate and unconditional truce from the people’s movements would, when refused by the Kremlin, delegitimize the regime in the eyes of its sympathizers.

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Oleksandr Kyselov comes from Donetsk. He is a left-wing activist and a research assistant at Uppsala University in Sweden.

The Peace That Cannot Come, by Oleksandr Kyselov – 22 January 2026

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