Articles

Cuba’s Precarious Situation, by Samuel Farber – 7 February 2026

Cuba is in the midst of what is perhaps the most difficult situation it has faced since January 1959. The political situation continues to deteriorate with the systematic repression of all collective protests, whether spontaneous ones such as those of July 11, 2021, and the many local protests that have taken place since then, or smaller actions such as the protests organized by Alina Bárbara López Hernández, which have been repressed even for the mere “crime” of carrying a blank sign in a park in Matanzas.

The economy continues its downward spiral, from the sharp decline in tourism to the virtual disappearance of the sugar industry. Much of this is the responsibility of the Cuban government, particularly its decision to prioritize building hotels to be leased as real estate to international hotel chains at the expense of other indispensable investments. At the same time, the regime continues—among its many other economic missteps—its systematic mistreatment of agriculture through the state procurement system known as Acopio, as well as the insufficient autonomy and support it has provided to small private farmers.

To all this must be added the fact that the highly authoritarian political system is itself a decisive economic factor. To a large extent, it systematically generates apathy, indifference, and economic irresponsibility due to the scarcity of incentives—whether economic incentives or political ones, such as democratic control from below, supported by independent trade unions and by mechanisms of democratic oversight created by workers in their offices and workshops.

The U.S. embargo—or blockade—has also contributed, and not insignificantly, to the grave economic situation on the island. In addition to the prohibitions that have existed since the early 1960s, such as restrictions on the sale of Cuban sugar in northern markets and the prohibition of U.S. investment in the island, the Trump administration considerably worsened the situation by banning travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba and, even more importantly, by exerting powerful pressure on international banks to sever all economic relations with Cuba. Indeed, the European Union formally complained to Washington some time ago about the introduction of an illegal policy of extraterritoriality when the United States sanctioned the economic activities of European firms in Cuba.

The Consequences of the Invasion of Venezuela

The events of January 3, when U.S. military forces landed in Caracas and kidnapped the dictator Nicolás Maduro, have clearly transformed the situation in Venezuela as well as in Cuba. The significance of this event lies not only in the fact that Venezuela will no longer supply oil to Cuba—deliveries had already declined before January 3—but also in the political magnitude that Trump himself has given to the intervention.

In the political reality that emerged after January 3, the invasion and kidnapping of Maduro were of great importance both politically and legally. Trump brazenly proclaimed that his administration in Washington would govern Venezuela, and in order to justify the invasion historically he repeatedly invoked the pro-imperialist president William McKinley and nothing less than the Monroe Doctrine in its full colonialist sense.

Beyond the conquest of Venezuela through indirect control of its government—as evidenced by the recent stipulation that the Venezuelan government must periodically submit its budgets to Washington for inspection—Trump also revived his campaign to acquire Greenland in order to consolidate his Monroe-doctrine credentials, given that the island belongs to Denmark, precisely the type of European power Monroe sought to eliminate from the hemisphere’s colonial sphere.

It is worth noting that amid this entire imperial and colonial spectacle something entirely new also appeared. Trump dispensed with the traditional fig leaf long used by Washington and offered absolutely no justification for his policy toward Venezuela in terms of democracy, freedom, or the other ideological themes traditionally invoked in U.S. foreign policy. Instead, he spoke bluntly about recovering “our” oil—oil that Venezuelan governments had apparently had the audacity to believe belonged to the natural and historical patrimony of their own country.

It is deeply regrettable that many Cubans, both on the island and abroad, have approved of Trump’s measures. But that does not mean that we should become accomplices to that support, which compromises us morally and politically and harms our democratic cause even in the short term, particularly in Latin America, and certainly among those Cubans who take the independence of their country seriously.

What is most serious for our people, however, is that Trump and his advisers—such as Marco Rubio—appear to have become intoxicated by their “victory” in Venezuela. Throughout January, major U.S. media outlets reported that Washington was seriously considering various actions against the Cuban government before the end of this year. The most alarming of these plans would be the establishment of a naval blockade of Cuba aimed specifically at preventing the export of oil to the island from any foreign country.

Such a measure would mean far more than the present crisis in Cuba: it would likely produce a near-total collapse of the Cuban economy, plunging the country into a chaotic situation resembling that of countries such as Libya or Syria.

A total blockade on the importation of oil into Cuba—and other tactics of this kind, such as the existing embargo/blockade—would constitute aggression not only against the government but also against the Cuban people as a whole. For that reason, the democratic opposition should oppose such policies of the U.S. government. This does not mean that the opposition must express that opposition in the same terms, purposes, or rhetoric used by the Cuban government. On the contrary, this would represent an important political opportunity—although tragically arising in the midst of a severe crisis—for the democratic opposition to demonstrate in practice the fraudulent character of the patriotic claims made by the authoritarian one-party system.

At the same time, these proposals may represent another strategy—something akin to an invitation to sectors of the Cuban regime to strike a Venezuelan-style deal with Trump. It is not difficult to imagine, for example, the generals who run GAESA considering such a “solution” in order to protect their interests. It has been reported that in recent days Alejandro Castro Espín, the son of Raúl Castro, has held meetings with Trump’s representatives to explore some agreement regarding Cuba–U.S. relations.

If these negotiations result in the release of Cuban political prisoners, that would certainly be welcome news. But we must remain alert to the possibility of a Venezuelan-style arrangement that would keep the current regime in power with the backing of a U.S. intervention.

What Does the Principle of Self-Determination Mean?

For more than a century, much has been said about the right of nations to self-determination. The issue gained particular prominence after the First World War, when both the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires collapsed, potentially liberating numerous peoples who had been subjected to those empires, especially in Central and Southeastern Europe and in the Middle East.

In this context it is worth noting that when political leaders such as Woodrow Wilson, then president of the United States, and V. I. Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik Revolution, spoke of self-determination, they generally referred to the self-determination of nations—not of states or governments.

This means that respect for national self-determination does not depend on the virtues or defects of a country’s government. It is not a reward reserved for rulers who behave well. When international public opinion rallied in 1935 to defend Ethiopia against the Italian invasion, it was not because they supported the empire of Haile Selassie, whose social system still included slavery. Rather, many believed that—quite apart from their opposition to Italian fascism—it was the Ethiopian people who had the right to decide the fate of their country.

In our case, national self-determination means that Cubans—and only Cubans—have both the right and the responsibility to resolve the grave problems facing their country, including an arbitrary authoritarianism that does not even respect its own laws and the absence of the most basic elements of democracy within the one-party system.

We cannot rely on foreign imperial powers as our liberators without seriously mortgaging Cuba’s future, as is happening today in Venezuela’s relationship with the United States.

This does not mean that democratic Cubans will not require support from abroad to achieve their emancipatory goals. The mambises who fought for Cuban independence received substantial support from Cubans and friends of Cuba abroad. The newspaper Patria, founded by José Martí in New York in 1892 in order to organize the armed struggle against Spanish rule through the Cuban Revolutionary Party, was financed not by the U.S. government but by Cuban emigrants in the United States—especially cigar workers in Florida.

It is important to note that movements that finance themselves tend to strengthen their organizational capacity, whereas funding from governments such as the United States not only reinforces political dependence but also encourages organizational passivity. In any case, it should be noted that Trump has virtually eliminated funding for organizations such as Radio Martí—leading to its closure—as well as for publications such as Diario de Cuba, which has nonetheless managed to survive so far.

It is estimated that more than one and a half million Cubans and Cuban Americans live in the United States, and approximately a quarter of a million Cubans live in Spain, in addition to tens of thousands of others scattered throughout the rest of the world. Unfortunately, some Cubans—especially in Florida—have embraced Trumpist authoritarianism despite the fact that his policies have mistreated Cubans just as they have other Latin American immigrants in matters as vital as political asylum and residency permits.

The problem is not that Cubans might become annexationists—a policy that in any case has no real future, since the U.S. Congress, with or without a Democratic majority, would reject such an option. Although Puerto Rico, for example, has an important annexationist movement, there is little chance that Congress—and even less President Trump—would admit it as the fifty-first state, particularly given that annexationists have not been able to secure a decisive electoral majority there. What is more likely is the further development of a Cuban current of neocolonial—or Plattist—opinion.

Yet many Cubans in the United States have not embraced Trumpism. This makes it easier to imagine the creation of a democratic movement among Cubans abroad to oppose arbitrariness and authoritarianism in Cuba. Finally, we should not overlook U.S. civil society as another potential source of support for Cuban democrats. In this regard, organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have denounced abuses of civil and democratic rights in Cuba for many decades.

Samuel Farber was born and raised in Cuba and has written numerous books and articles about that country as well as the Russian Revolution and American politics. He is a Professor Emeritus of the City University of New York (CUNY) and resides in that city.

The original Spanish version of this article was first published in Sin Permiso. This English version was first published on the Left Renewal Blog.

, , , , , , , ,
Views: 14
More content from this blog
, , , , , , , ,