“We Want a Jewish-Arab Government (memshala)” – chant heard in Tel Aviv after the elections
I am a binationalist. Does that mean I am an anti-Zionist? Today, probably. A Zionist? Yes, if I lived in 1930. Something else? That remains to be seen. Today when most people hear the term binationalism – if they know what it is at all – they see it as a failed quaint project led by a small group of intellectual utopians around the Hebrew University in the 1920s. It is viewed as a relic of the past, swept away by reality. To paraphrase Irving Kristol, “A Zionist today is a Binationalist mugged by reality.” Not so fast.
It may be time to reconsider binationalism. Below I examine some of the contours and history of binationalism, a movement among Zionists that began with Brit Shalom founded in 1925 (lasting until 1933). This small cadre of Zionist thinkers, mostly from Central Europe, many of whom lived in the Land (others such as Martin Buber only came to the Land later, and Robert Weltsch and Henrietta Szold, founder of Hadassah, lived in the Diaspora) promoting a Jewish-Arab binational state, decidedly not a Jewish state as a way for Zionism to fulfill what they believed was its raison d’être, a revival, and fulfillment, of Judaism. In his response to Hermann Cohen, in 1916 Martin Buber wrote, “We want Palestine ‘not for the Jews’ but for mankind. We want it for the realization of Judaism.” (Buber, “Zion, the State, and Humanity” in Der Jude, 1916-17).
Many were influenced by the writings of Ahad Ha-Am (1856-1927) who was not a member of this group albeit his cultural Zionism served as a foundation for the group. Ahad Ha-Am did support their opposition to the political statist Zionism of Theodor Herzl. As Zohar Maor wrote, “Ahad Ha-Am never renounced the dream of a Jewish nation-state, but his particular cultural orientation certainly enabled his followers in Brit Shalom to do so.” (Maor, “Moderation from Right to Left: The Hidden Roots of Brit Shalom”).
It is interesting to note that many members of Brit Shalom came from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Galicia which were both multiethnic and cosmopolitan societies where Jews integrated culturally and politically (here see Joshua Shanes’ Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish Identity in Habsburg Galicia here). This gave rise to what has been called “humanistic nationalism” or, as Buber preferred, “Hebrew Nationalism” or Hannah Arendt’s “Non-Nationalist Nationalism,” as models for a state in Palestine (see R.M. Eddon, “Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt and the Paradox of ‘Non-Nationalist’ Nationalism”).
The group disbanded in 1936 and then in 1942 another similar group called Ichud formed around Buber (who was already living in Jerusalem), Szold and others, to continue promoting binationalism even in the wake of the realization of the founding of a Jewish state. As a historical phenomenon, Brit Shalom and binationalism is a fascinating example of a path not taken, for a variety of reasons. The most common critique of Brit Shalom is that they did not find Arab partners (I use the term Arab and not Palestinian throughout as that was the term used at the time) in their binational project. This is certainly true, but we must remember that in the 1920s the Jews constituted a small minority in Palestine. In the first British Census in 1922 about 83,500 Jews lived in Palestine out of a total population of 757,000. That would increase after the rise of Hitler in 1933, but the Jews did not constitute a majority in Palestine until 1948. Thus, it is not unreasonable to recognize that the large majority of Arabs in Palestine would not readily consider a binational state with equal representation of a small minority population.
In a letter to Hans Kohn on May 30, 1928, Arthur Ruppin, one of the founders of Brit Shalom writes,
History has known such penetrations of one nation into a foreign land only through conquest, but it has not yet happened that one nation willingly agreed that another nation come and request full equality of rights and national life alongside it.
The fact that the Arab majority did not agree to the Zionists’ conditions was not unreasonable, and many Zionists knew that, and accepted it. One in particular was Rav Binyamin (Yehoshua Radler-Feldman, 1880–1957), a founding member of Brit Shalom and Kibbutz Kinneret (see the newly published book by Ari-Ram Tzoref, A Volcano of Our Own Making: R. Binyamin, Binationalism, and Counter-Zionism here).
What exactly did Brit Shalom want? In the preface to the inaugural volume of She’ifotenu the journal of Brit Shalom (1927) we read;
Brit Shalom wishes to create here in Eretz Yisrael a state inhabited jointly by the two peoples living in this country living under complete equality of rights, as the two elements which jointly and equally determine the destiny of this country, without regard for the fact which of the two is, at any particular time, numerically superior.
If binationalism failed in the pre-state era, why reconsider it now? This is a legitimate question that needs to be addressed. My working assumption is that the binationalism of Brit Shalom was certainly aspirational and, in many ways, premature. Its lasting value from my perspective is that their warnings of what would transpire in a Jewish state, that is, a Jewish state with a significant minority of Arabs surrounded by Arab countries, have come to pass. In short, from their perspective, a binational state was the only way for Jews, and Zionism, to fulfill its mission of reviving Judaism in the Jewish homeland. Otherwise, they feared, it will become a warring state that will succumb to nationalist fervor and chauvinist immorality. Its own religiosity would be a means to serve nationalist ends. That is, it will be a Jewish state but not a state that represented Judaism as they understood it.
In She’ifotenu 1.3 (1929) Shmuel Hugo Bergman writes,
The difference between the political outlook of Brit Shalom and our opponents is not based on our attitude toward the Arabs in Palestine only but is much more profound: our political outlook stems from the philosophy of Judaism. We want Palestine to be our land in the sense that the political and moral outlook of Judaism leave an imprint on the life in this country….When they [political Zionists] talk about Palestine as our land, the term ‘our land’ means our land and not theirs. This philosophy is borrowed from Europe in the era of its decline and founded on the conception of the state which is the property of one people only…This injustice is being justified by the holy egoism of the state.
S.H. Bergman, “On the Majority Question”
Bergman continues in a diary entry, “Zionism must un-Europeanize itself…all the remains of European ideologies, which are associated with the concepts of national languages, states, etc. must be abolished.” (Bergman, Diary, August 12, 1928).
Brit Shalom was founded on the assumption that the Land does not belong to the Jews, it belongs to no one exclusively. As Aharon Kedar notes in his 1981 essay “Brith Shalom” (Documents and Introduction) (The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 18) on claims to the land,
The argument of Jewish history is older; the argument of Arab history is more continuous; and the argument of Christian history is, in many ways, the more intense. But one is as good as the other.
This is why many of them opposed the Balfour Declaration in 1917 (even Ahad Ha-Am had misgivings as I developed in a previous Substack here) and partition in 1937. For example, after the Partition Plan, Judah Magnes published an op-ed in the New York Times claiming that if partition went through and a Jewish state was founded, it would find itself in endless war with its neighbors. Suffice it to say he was not wrong.
Brit Shalom demanded that Zionists disassociate themselves from Balfour claiming it was the “original sin” of Zionism. Their reasons were numerous but in large part it was because they opposed tying Zionism to the imperialism of the British Empire. Here they opposed the path of Chaim Weizmann who supported Zionism’s relationship with British Imperialism thinking it was the best, and most likely, path toward statehood (here see Arie Dubnow’s forthcoming book Zionism before Israel: Jewish Nationalism in an Age of Empire, Harvard University Press, 2027 here). But from the Palestinian perspective, as Edward Said argued in The Question of Palestine, it resulted in the indigenous population viewing the Zionists as colonizing the land. Martin Buber argued similarly, advocating a Near East Federation instead of a state founded by, and attached to, imperial powers.
There was some sympathy for Brit Shalom’s position even before its founding. For example, in the Twelfth Zionist Congress in Carlsbad in 1921 it was recorded,
…a desire of the Hebrew people to live together with the Arab people in a relation of equality and mutual respect, and to jointly develop with the Arab people their common homeland and make it a fertile country assuring the undisturbed existence of both nations.
Many in Brit Shalom agreed, albeit they believed that a Jewish state could never fulfill that aspiration. Ethnonationalism could not produce a just society with a larger minority population. We must remember that in 1925 many of these founders had witnessed the mass death and destruction of World War I, some first-hand. That must have had a profound impact on their views on the perils of nationalism. They did not want Jews to re-produce that in the Land. In a pamphlet in 1929 entitled “Like all the Nations” Judah Magnes argued that Balfour should be the first step of an agreement with the Arabs and not a declaration that divided them [my italics]. Similarly, in the Introduction to the second edition of his collected writings ‘Al Parshat Derakhim, Ahad Ha-Am argued that Balfour was being intentionally misread by Zionists to claim it affirmed the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (the word “state” was never used in the declaration although Weizmann lobbied that it be included).
1929 and October 7 and Brit Shalom
Many people have chosen to view October 7 through the lens of the Holocaust. They did not equate the two, which are categorically different, but rather focused on the fact that October 7 was the largest one-day death toll of Jews since the Holocaust, which was true. But the Holocaust was so different in so many ways. Not only in the magnitude of death but the power dynamics of perpetrator and victim such that any analogy, however attenuated, is mistaken. A better analogy might be the massacre of Jews in Palestine in 1929. The pre-history of 1929 and what sparked the uprising is developed expertly in Hillel Cohen’s Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1929 (here).
Sparked by a debate about Jews erecting a mehitza (a gender divider separating men and women) at the Western Wall for prayer (then buttressing an Arab neighborhood) the riots and death of 133 Jews were viewed by many as the beginning of the “Arab national movement” in Palestine. By that time, Arabs in Palestine began realizing that Jewish immigration to the Land was not simply a desire to live in the Holy Land (Eretz Ha-Kodesh) but a veritable state-building project. Arthur Ruppin, a founder of Brit Shalom, was also the director of the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization and supervised the tactical purchase of land from absentee Arab landlords that was (correctly) interpreted by the Arab majority as more than simply settlement in the land. It was creating conditions for a state. Of course, they were right.
Be that as it may, 1929 was a pivotal year for those in the Yishuv (Jews in the Land before the state) and for Brit Shalom. Zionists came to realize, correctly, that the Arab population would not easily acquiesce to the Zionist project. Some, like Gershom Scholem, resigned from Brit Shalom after 1929, losing faith in its aspirations. Others, like Hans Kohn, resigned from his position in Keren Ha-Yesod after the harsh Jewish reprisals in 1929, leaving Zionism and Palestine and immigrating to America. In his resignation letter, Kohn wrote, “Zionism will be peaceful or it will be without me. Zionism is not tantamount to Judaism.”
Many in Brit Shalom held the Zionists had a share in the blame of 1929. Again, Kohn writes,
We claim to be innocent victims. Naturally the Arabs attacked us in August (1929). Since they have no army at their disposal, they could not have been expected to obey the rules of war. They perpetrated all the barbaric acts which are characteristic of colonial revolts. But we are obliged to look for deeper causes in this. We have been in Palestine for twelve years without having made the slightest attempt to gain the approval of the local population through negotiations. We have depended solely on British military strength.
Kohn, “Letter of Resignation”, 1929
These words were certainly not widely shared post-1929, but one can hear in them things said post October 7. Of course, circumstances as well as the scale of violence, is different but in some way the state responded to October 7 in a way not dissimilar to 1929 (albeit much more violently and on a much larger scale). Instead of recognizing what Kohn called in 1929 the “deeper causes” of the atrocities of October 7, without exonerating and defending them, some of us believe this is a missed opportunity to re-think the past half century in a similar way Kohn wanted his readers to re-think “the past twelve years.” One can be a “victim” and still not be “innocent.” Jews have so often been, in fact, “innocent victims” that we have lost the ability to make a distinction between victimhood and complicity, something deeply a part of the Hebrew Prophets.
It is true, as Kohn noted, that for the most part, Zionists in the early years did not consider the Arab population as anything other than a problem that would solve itself through voluntary emigration or be solved through domination and control. When asked how he related to the Arabs in Palestine, Jabotinsky said, “with polite indifference.”
After 1917 Zionists thought they had the imperial powers on their side (they were right), in large part because of four related but not identical factors: colonialism, imperialism, Christian restorationism, and antisemitism (Zionism was a good way to get Jews out of Europe). Zionists knew all of that and used each to their benefit. For example, after getting notice of a pogrom in Europe, Herzl noted in his diary “I can use that with my consultation with the Sultan.”
I have written extensively on Substack about the conditions that led to October 7 (in a series called The October 6 project). I do not rehearse them here but only reiterate that October 7 could have been a sign, as Brit Shalom believed about 1929, a turning point that while the atrocity was indefensible, something on our side is terribly wrong, and continuing on that path (which is what Israel chose in obliterating Gaza) will not change the conditions but only exacerbate them. Oppressed people will not abandon the desire for freedom, and Jews of all people should know that.
Why Return to Brit Shalom and Binationalism Now?
Many people seem wed to the notion that history yields unalterable results, that the unfolding of events disqualifies options and ideologies that once flourished or were viable. This is common in the renewed interest about the Bund. If the Bund failed, why should we re-consider it now? I find this a facile, albeit convenient, way of reading history. Ideas emerge and at times fail, given contingencies not related to the ideas themselves. What is so relevant about Brit Shalom in this context is not only the project of binationalism per se, an idea whose time, at least as they envisioned it, may have passed. However, the dangers they saw on the horizon of majoritarian political Zionism in large part have indeed come to pass. As S.H. Bergman wrote in 1929,
We want to eliminate in advance the notions of ‘minority-majority’ in the lives of two peoples. We wish to create a regime which will safeguard for both peoples their equality of rights without regard to relative numbers…because just as being a majority is not our aim and ambition, so losing this majority must not awaken your fears.
The Jewish majority was achieved in 1948 and yet today, in 2026 that majority has thinned considerably resulting from the occupation in 1967. Between the river and the sea, the population of Jews and Palestinians in the Land under Israeli control (in the West Bank) is almost equal. And yet that slim majority rules with an iron fist, following Jabotinsky that doing so is necessary for Jewish safety, even as it results in domination and oppression. For Jabotinsky that was the price that must be paid for centuries of oppression. In his time Jabotinsky’s position was marginal (he resigned from the Zionist Congress and founded the New Zionist Organization). Today it has become normative.
The issue is not only a moral one but a pragmatic one as well. Can domination last? October 7 should have shown us that it cannot. Maintaining domination is a short-sighted non-solution to the integral problem of injustice and inequality.
Brit Shalom’s binationalism aspired toward a different vision – not a Jewish state, but a Jewish-Arab state of equality of all who live between the river and the sea. Not as a matter of pure statecraft but as the fulfillment of Judaism’s ethical core. Even as Israel’s Declaration of Independence makes the claim of “equality” (Ben Gurion was insistent the word “democracy” does not appear) there is no one who really thinks that is the reality of today’s Israel. And not only because of Palestinian resistance (see my review of Hillel Cohen’s book The Good Arabs here).
Brit Shalom maintained that a “Jewish” state would not, could not, instantiate true equality. Such a view was viewed as utopian at the time. And maybe it was. But recall it was espoused by those who considered themselves Zionists. Binationalism was once a Zionist position. Today it would likely be considered anti-Zionist as it opposes a Jewish state in both principle and practice. One could say that binationalism’s utopianism was the result of being a small minority trying to make a case for partnership with a significant majority. And the political reality of 1925 is certainly not the reality of 2026. But that does not mean those voices of 1925 should be relegated to the dustbin of history. History has a funny way of not forgetting.
Today Jews are a (slim) majority in the Land (from the river to the sea). And in almost complete control. I would suggest the present reality requires some utopian thinking because “realistic” thinking, or Realpolitik, has resulted in massacre, the destruction of a society, and the continuing devolution of the moral character of the state in response to what many perceive as an “existential fear.” Fear may be real, but ruling from fear, as history has taught us, justifies egregious behavior. S.H. Bergman in the essay from 1929 cited above notes,
One cannot aspire to become a majority in order to abolish the morality of the majority. The means contradicts the aim, and instead of achieving the aim, you will subjugate yourself to the means. The psychology of power will consume you: it is already consuming us.
The extent to which this resonates a century later after the destruction of Gaza is ominous.
We are a century past the founding of Brit Shalom. Its aspirational Zionism that was deeply and proximately aware of the danger of nationalism obviously did not come to pass. In some way, the fate of the Jews in Europe after 1933 made that impossible. But we are now eighty years from 1945. The Holocaust remains a lasting specter in Jewish life. Whether it should drive how we move forward in this transitional moment, whether an “existential threat” is a healthy and just – or even viable – way for a collective to chart its future, is another question.
Brit Shalom had a vision. It was a good vision; it was a just vision; it was a Jewish vision. It used to be a “Zionist” vision. Now it is an anti-Zionist one. But sometimes the past comes back in unpredictable, and surprising, ways.
Three years after the atrocities in Gaza with over 75,000 deaths, about 80% of Palestinian Israelis (many of whom have relatives who were killed or maimed in Gaza) went to the polls in Israel to vote their conscience as citizens of a state that consistently marginalizes them. The result was that the voice of the Palestinian Israeli now makes up 16% of the Knesset. For scale, Blacks in America only make up 14% of the population. How many Blacks are in Congress? Today (before the recent election) about 12% of Congresspeople are Black.
Palestinian Israelis, after the massive deaths of Gaza, continue to choose the “ballot.” This itself is quite amazing. Historians will unpack what it means long after we’re gone. And let us not forget that while 80% of Palestinian Israelis voted, 0% of Palestinians in the West Bank could vote as they are not citizens. They have no voice to express how those who rule their lives treat them.
Are we seeing a return of the binationalism Brit Shalom stood for in 1925? Probably not. Perhaps it is another kind of binationalism.
In the streets of Tel Aviv, one could hear the chant “We want a Jewish-Arab government.” Has binationalism returned? Are we willing to listen? And what is the price if we don’t?
(with thanks to Carla Sulzbach)
Shaul Magid is professor of Modern Judaism at Harvard Divinity School, senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of World Religions at Harvard and rabbi of the Fire Island Synagogue. His recent books include ‘The Necessity of Exile’ (Ayin Press, 2023) and his annotated translation ‘Jewish Anti-Zionism as Political Theology: The Major Writings of Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum’ (University of California Press, 2026).
This article first appeared on the author’s Substack and is republished here with permission.
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