The move reflects a broader strategic vision embracing gender liberation, pluralism, and local democracy
The formal announcement of the PKK’s dissolution has sparked mixed reactions among Turkey’s Kurds and international supporters. However, it has been years in the making and comes as no surprise to long-term observers of the Kurdish movement and readers of Abdullah Öcalan‘s theory of Democratic Confederalism. The shift had been indicated months earlier and signifies a strategic transformation aligned with a broader vision of autonomy beyond the state, the party, and the armed struggle.
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was founded in 1978 and launched an armed struggle in 1984, demanding Kurdish autonomy. Turkey responded with harsh military repression, and the two sides became entangled in a bloody conflict that lasted for decades. Over the course of this war, between 40,000 and 50,000 people were killed, including civilians, PKK fighters, Turkish soldiers, police, and village guards. The 1990s were particularly brutal, marked by widespread village burnings, forced displacements affecting up to 3 million people, and systemic human rights abuses. Despite several attempts at ceasefires and peace talks, the violence periodically escalated—especially after the collapse of negotiations in 2015, when renewed urban warfare brought heavy casualties to cities like Cizre and Sur.
Since Öcalan’s capture in 1999, the Kurdish freedom movement has gradually shifted away from traditional models of armed vanguardism, nationalist statism and Stalinist rigidity. While the PKK maintained its armed forces—particularly in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan—its ideological orientation increasingly prioritised social transformation over military confrontation.
This shift found structural expression in the formation of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) in the early 2000s: an umbrella of organisations with a decentralised and horizontal character. The KCK encompasses a wide array of communities, political parties, citizen initiatives, committees, and grassroots institutions across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. It represents a deliberate move away from the rigid, centralised model of the vanguard party, in favour of a networked configuration grounded in direct participation and local autonomy.
In Turkey, the KCK has been politically active in coordinating cultural, social, and municipalist initiatives. It has succeeded in winning local councils and electing candidates to mayoral positions. The Turkish state has responded with sustained repression, including mass arrests of alleged “KCK members” over the past decade.
In this new worldview, the space for a hierarchical party structure like the PKK has been steadily shrinking. Öcalan’s February 2025 call for the PKK to formally dissolve was met with support from officials within Kongra-Gel, the legislative body of the KCK that claimed that this step “marks the beginning of a broader democracy movement—one that includes women, workers, and environmental activists”, thus being more aligned with the framework of Democratic Modernity.
Democratic confederalism was first articulated within the PKK and found its most visible, though partial, implementation in Rojava. Where the PKK once contributed to ethnic polarisation within Turkey and even among Kurds, the Rojava model now emphasises the transition to plurality, feminism, and decentralisation. For over a decade, the region has resisted Turkish invasions, ISIS offensives, regime hostility, and international neglect, all while pushing the social and political revolution. Like the Zapatistas—whose influence is evident across the movement—Kurdish cadres have redefined and demystified the idea of armed struggle. Central to this paradigm is Jineology—the “science of women”—which frames women’s liberation as the foundation of any meaningful revolutionary process.
Turning Point
The decision to end the cycle of armed polarisation with the Turkish state could signal a turn toward a more contemporary revolutionary horizon—one grounded not in elite substitution, but in mass participation. Rojava, too, is entering a new phase. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have signed an initial agreement with Syria’s central government to initiate negotiations for formal recognition of the region’s autonomous status—not as an independent nation-state, but as a decentralised component of a reimagined Syrian polity. Though past efforts were blocked under Assad, shifting power dynamics have reopened the possibility of dialogue. The ideas of confederalism and gender liberation may now be closer than ever to broader realisation and territorial grounding. Despite the grave dangers from negotiating with the jihadist Syrian regime, the Kurdish administration continues to push forward, seeking recognition as a self-governing entity within a fractured and centralised region.
This evolution naturally coincides with the PKK’s disbandment. In Turkey, these developments may challenge the regime’s foundational narrative. For decades, Ankara has used the PKK’s designation as a terrorist organisation to justify military operations, political repression, and the targeting of Kurdish organisations, journalists, and international allies. It has claimed that all Kurdish structures—from the PYD to the YPG/YPJ and the SDF—are fronts for the PKK. With the PKK now dissolved, the legal rationale for this strategy is weakened. Though state discourse may persist, its credibility—especially internationally—could erode. This could offer Erdoğan the opportunity to pivot toward a political approach that acknowledges Kurdish autonomy in exchange for domestic stability and constitutional leverage. Ankara’s recent pledges of financial support to Kurdish-majority regions—which comprise roughly 15–20% of Turkey’s territory and are home to an estimated 12–17 million people—may be signs of this shift.
The big question is whether the Turkish authoritarian regime will allow such a democratic approach, or whether it will force the Kurdish movement back into armed insurgency. In the past, the PKK attempted several times to withdraw its forces from Turkey, but each time the process was disrupted by the Turkish state.
What comes next is uncertain. The history of betrayal runs deep, and the risks of co-optation or renewed repression remain. Yet the Kurdish movement has demonstrated extraordinary adaptability, rooted in lived resistance and revolutionary imagination. If this is the end of the party, it may well mark the beginning of something deeper: a stateless alternative struggling to survive amid the ruins of the patriarchal nation-state.
Originally published by Freedom News.