What is the role of the rehabilitation of Stalinism in Putin’s official ideology? How should the democratic left approach it? Publicist Daniel Traubenberg describes the evolution of attitudes towards Stalin in Russia from the collapse of the USSR to the present day.
There’s been a rehabilitation of the Stalin era in Russia in recent decades. It has come with an enthusiastic re-evaluation of Soviet history, including its most controversial aspects. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, this process has significantly accelerated and is beginning to take on the features of an official state memory policy. Joseph Stalin is increasingly portrayed not only as a political leader who played a key role in the country’s industrialization and its victory in the Great Patriotic War but also as an effective manager capable of imposing “order” in times of crisis.
More and more, high-ranking officials and political figures in Russia are expressing positive attitudes towards Stalin. Vladimir Putin, for example, has repeatedly called for a more balanced assessment of Stalin’s role in history, emphasizing his contribution to the country’s development. Monuments to Stalin have appeared in some regions, indicating growing support for such initiatives at the local level. In 2024, for example, a statue of Joseph Stalin was erected in Vologda. The region’s governor attended the unveiling ceremony. Such events are usually accompanied by narratives about the need to preserve historical memory and the importance of patriotic education.
This rehabilitation of Stalin is also reflected in sociological data. According to polls, the percentage of Russians who have a positive view of Stalin is growing annually. This trend does not just concern the older generation — it’s increasing among youth as well. Narratives that justify repression as a “necessary measure” to achieve state goals have also been revived in public discourse. This position is criticized by human rights defenders and researchers who highlight the mass repression and human rights violations of the Stalin era.
Protest Stalinism in the 1990s
Post-Soviet Stalinism has a complex and multifaceted history. It originated after the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent transition to a market economy. One of the major reasons for the revival of Stalinism in public consciousness was widespread disillusionment with the reforms of the 1990s. These reforms, which included privatization, high inflation, and the dismantling of social guarantees, led to the impoverishment of millions. In the public mind, Stalin came to symbolize the “strongman” who imposed social order, in contrast to the chaos and injustice of the post-Soviet transformation.
The idealization of Stalin was also a response to the intense criticism of the Soviet period from liberal politicians and intellectuals in the government and media during the 1990s. A significant part of the population saw this criticism as an insult and a devaluation of their past. Stalinism, on the other hand, offered an alternative narrative focused on industrialization, military victory, and social equality. Amid the loss of their former identity, Stalinist rhetoric took on elements of nostalgia for a time when the state seemed to provide order and justice.
Many opposition political parties in the 1990s either directly embraced Stalinist views or exploited the cult of Stalin to mobilize socially vulnerable groups dissatisfied with liberal reforms.
Examples of such political movements include Viktor Anpilov’s “Labor Russia” and the Russian Communist Workers’ Party (RCWP). These organizations actively criticized market reforms, privatization, worsening living conditions, and the destruction of the Soviet social security system. In their policy documents and public speeches, they portrayed Stalin as the symbol of a just social state, industrial development, and an independent foreign policy. All of this is in contrast with the “betrayal” of the liberal elite that came to power in the wake of the collapse of the USSR.
“Labor Russia” employed Stalinist symbolism at rallies. Their organized processions featured portraits of Stalin and advocated for the restoration of a socialist economy based on the Stalinist model. The RCWP positioned itself as a direct successor to the Leninist-Stalinist tradition. It not only rejected capitalism but also the policies of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), which it considered too moderate and conciliatory.
Stalin has also become popular among national-conservative and monarchist groups. They remove Stalinism from its Marxist context and focus on elements of national mobilization, state sovereignty, and repressive policies. It was during this period that the term “red-brown” emerged to denote an ideological bond between left-wing revanchists and right-wing nationalists, united on the platform of anti-liberalism and anti-Western sentiment.
For a significant part of these national patriots, a key phase of Stalinism was the period of the “anti-cosmopolitanism campaign” in the late 1940s to early 1950s. In that period, Soviet propaganda actively appealed to national values and reinforced statism and Russian ethnocentrism. This period fully embraced nationalist rhetoric, making it particularly appealing to conservatives and monarchists who saw the Stalinist state as a successor to the Russian Empire.
The ideology of the “red-brown” movement was largely based on the concepts of Russian national Bolshevism that emerged within the Russian émigré community in the 1920s and 1930s. Nikolai Ustryalov, a former cadet and “White” anti-Bolshevik émigré, later became one of the ideologues of “smenovekhovstvo” (derived from Change of Signposts) — a movement that saw the USSR under Stalin as a revival of an imperial order akin to tsarist autocracy. This concept formed the reason why some former white army officers and intellectuals eventually recognized Stalin as the successor to Russian statehood.
In the second half of the 20th century, this idea was further developed in national-patriotic circles in the USSR and later in post-Soviet Russia. Writer and publicist Alexander Prokhanov became one of the key representatives of this movement. In his works and the newspaper Zavtra, he synthesized elements of Stalinism, Russian Orthodox messianism, and monarchist ideology. He portrayed Stalin as the “Red Emperor.” For him, Stalin ceased to be merely a Marxist revolutionary. He became a symbol of the Russian imperial power that figures like Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible embody.
Thus, the idea of merging Stalinism and Orthodox monarchism, as presented in the works of Prokhanov and his like-minded colleagues, became part of a broader trend of rethinking the Soviet past. In this context, communist ideology and the dictatorship of the proletariat receded into the background to make way for the idealized concept of a “strong but just” ruler and defender of traditional values and national sovereignty.
Stalinism of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF)
The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) became the leading opposition force in the 1990s. It opposed the Kremlin’s reforms and expressed the interests of a significant part of the post-Soviet working class, which had suffered while under neoliberal economic transformations. However, the party was more of a moderate left-patriotic force than a radical communist movement.
During this period, the CPRF’s economic program was social-democratic. It focused not on revolutionary change, but on restoring elements of state regulation and social security that had been dismantled during the market reforms. Party leader, Gennady Zyuganov, emphasized the need for a strong state economy, support for domestic production, and social justice. But he did not challenge the existing system of market relations.
Ideologically, the CPRF was an eclectic combination of Marxist-Leninist, national-patriotic, and conservative elements. The party’s rhetoric actively invoked Stalinism as a symbol of a “strong state,” which appealed to those nostalgic for the Soviet era. At the same time, the national-conservative rhetoric, which included appeals to “traditional values” and Russian national revival, helped unite Communist voters with broader segments of the population, including proponents of Russian patriotism. As a result, the CPRF of the 1990s was less a radical communist party than the left wing of the national-patriotic opposition that operated within the legal political framework and did not seek a systemic break with the existing order.
In the 2000s, after undergoing a series of transformations, the CPRF gradually lost its active opposition role and became integrated into Vladimir Putin’s political system. Amid the growing centralization of power and the suppression of non-systemic opposition, the party abandoned its radical critique of the current regime and effectively transformed itself into a loyal parliamentary opposition. It limited its activities to rhetorical statements and participation in electoral processes without posing a real threat to the government.
One of the key areas of activity for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) during this period was the policy on historical memory. The party focused on revising the post-Soviet narrative of the Soviet past, particularly by rehabilitating the Stalin era. Its rhetoric vigorously promoted the idea of reassessing Soviet history, criticizing the 1990s as the “time of troubles,” and asserting the continuity of modern Russia with the Soviet state. This was reflected in the methodic initiation of monuments to Joseph Stalin, support for official events related to Soviet historical dates, and the promotion of the thesis that Stalin played a positive role in the country’s development.
The focus on the policy of memory allowed the CPRF to maintain voters’ support among segments of the population nostalgic for the USSR. At the same time, however, it contributed to the party’s transformation into a conservative force increasingly oriented toward traditionalism and state paternalism.
Internal divisions within the CPRF became noticeable between 2018 and 2020 when an opposition wing began to form within the party that consisted largely of young activists and regional politicians. These representatives of the new generation rejected the party’s traditional synthesis of Stalinism and national conservatism. Instead, they advocated for an update of the ideological platform in the spirit of modern social democracy. Their rhetoric called for a democratization of the political system, stronger social policies, and a departure from the conservative course that had dominated the CPRF in recent decades.
The growing influence of this wing might have led to a partial transformation of the CPRF in post-Putin Russia to bring it closer to European left-wing parties. However, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the opposition within the party came under considerable pressure. Some of its members were subjected to party purges. Others chose to distance themselves from public politics and avoid making open statements. As a result, the party definitively solidified its status as a systemic opposition, loyal to the authorities, and integrated into the state political system. The possibilities for its future development into a more progressive left-wing force are now limited.
The Kremlin and Stalinism
The Kremlin’s attitude toward Stalinism has significantly changed over the past few decades as state ideology and political strategy has evolved. In the 1990s, the official discourse was predominantly critical of the Soviet period, especially Stalinism, which was seen as a deviation from Russia’s supposed European path of development. During this time, views toward the Stalin era fell in line with the government’s liberal-Western course. Stalinism was harshly criticized for its repressions, totalitarian governance, and human rights violations.
These attitudes began to shift after Vladimir Putin came to power in the early 2000s. State rhetoric gradually moved away from the unequivocal condemnation of Stalinism, and certain elements of it started to be incorporated into the new official patriotic narrative. A symbolic sign was the restoration of the USSR anthem (with new lyrics). This signaled the government’s desire for continuity with the Soviet past. But central to this historical narrative was using the memory of the Great Patriotic War as a tool for consolidating society and legitimizing power.
Nevertheless, there was no official rehabilitation of Stalin in the early years of Putin’s rule. Stalin’s rule continued to be viewed critically, especially concerning political repressions. However, as authoritarian tendencies within the Russian political system increased, the Kremlin increasingly adopted a conservative ideology reminiscent of the so-called “red-brown” movement of the 1990s. This blended Stalinist motifs of state grandeur and centralized power with Orthodox monarchist ideas that emphasized the historical uniqueness and sacredness of Russian statehood.
Since 2014, a national conservative ideology has taken full shape in Russia. Disparate historical periods exist with the framework of continuity and millennial statehood. In this narrative, both the imperial and Soviet periods are interpreted as different manifestations of a unified Russian state, where continuity of power and traditions are considered the defining factors of historical development.
In this framework, the Russian Revolution of 1917 is not seen as a social upheaval that led to a radical transformation of the social order. Rather, it was a destructive episode that weakened the state in the interests of external forces. In this view, the Bolsheviks are portrayed either as utopian fanatics who destabilized the country in their pursuit of world revolution or as agents of foreign influence who contributed to the disintegration of historic Russia.
The Stalinist period largely aligns with this conservative historical narrative. It represents a period of increased state centralization, a return to traditional social norms, and the suppression of revolutionary experimentation. After defeating the leftist (Trotskyist) and rightist (Bukharinist) opposition, Stalin consolidated his power and established a totalitarian system of governance that incorporated elements of the autocratic model.
During this period, many of the radical changes initiated in the early years of Soviet power were reversed. In social policy, progressive reforms were rolled back: the policy of sexual liberation was reversed, abortions were banned (1936), and criminal penalties for homosexuality were reinstated (1934). National policy also underwent a significant change: while the 1920s saw the policy of “korenizatsiia,” which supported national cultures and human resources, this was rolled back in the 1930s, accompanied by repressions against national elites.
Similar shifts occurred in the arts sphere. While the 1920s had been dominated by avant-garde art, Futurism, and Constructivism, the 1930s saw a move toward artistic unification. Socialist realism was proclaimed the official style, and all alternative artistic movements were suppressed.
The official narrative now portrays Stalin as a statesman who rejected revolutionary utopianism. He modernized the country, and that led to victory in the Great Patriotic War. This image is part of a broader conservative shift in how the Stalinist era has been viewed in recent decades. Stalin is now seen as a leader who restored stability after the destructive revolutionary experiments and internal turmoil of earlier years and brought the country onto the world stage by modernizing industry and the military, which later played a key role in the victory over Nazi Germany.
Some pro-government thinkers, such as the aforementioned Alexander Prokhanov, argue that Stalin not only modernized the Soviet Union but also continued the work of the Russian tsars. In their view, Stalin’s policies, particularly those aimed at strengthening centralized power and building a robust state, represented a restoration of the greatness of the Russian Empire. His actions, they say, continued the traditions of autocratic rule. According to these authors, Stalin not only restored but also consolidated the unity of the country, defended it against external threats, and strengthened its political and cultural identity. These achievements are consistent with the goals pursued by Russian monarchs throughout history.
Contemporary Russia’s ideological rhetoric now revolves around Vladimir Putin as the successor to both the Russian tsars and Stalin in the struggle against Western influence. In this narrative, Putin is a defender of national sovereignty and a leader who continues the historical tradition of a strong, centralized state capable of withstanding external threats. This “re-Stalinization” has become particularly pronounced since the beginning of the “special military operation” and the heightened rhetoric framing the external threat in terms of “Ukrainian Nazis.”
Reflection of the Post-Soviet Democratic Left on Stalinism
Stalinist totalitarianism left a bloody legacy throughout the communist movement and significantly tarnished socialist ideals on the international stage. Throughout the 20th century, various factions within the left movement criticized Stalinism as a bureaucratic degeneration of the revolution, a substitution of the dictatorship of the proletariat for that of the party nomenclature, and a betrayal of democratic socialism. However, these anti-Stalinist movements arose primarily in Western countries, where conditions allowed for ideological and political debate. In the Soviet Union itself, after the defeat of the Left Opposition in the 1920s and 1930s, alternative Marxist and socialist currents were eliminated and their adherents either repressed or forced into exile. In the years that followed, anti-Stalinist criticism existed only in the form of small dissident groups with little influence on the socio-political life of the country.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, small left organizations began to emerge in the post-Soviet space primarily oriented to the anti-Stalinist tradition, with a strong emphasis on Trotskyism. These groups sought to reexamine the Soviet experience through the lens of the critique of Stalinism formulated by Leon Trotsky and his followers. Trotskyist organizations viewed Stalinism as a bureaucratic counterrevolution that dismantled the democratic elements of the early Soviet state, replaced the power of the Soviets with a totalitarian state apparatus, and reduced socialism to an authoritarian administrative model.
Among the anti-Stalinist leftists in post-Soviet Russia, some individuals did not identify with the Trotskyist tradition but nevertheless criticized Stalinism from a Marxist perspective. One such figure was the Marxist scholar and economist Alexander Buzgalin who founded the leftist journal Alternatives and was an active participant in the informal left movement during perestroika.
Stalin came to represent patriarchal-conservative forces, which increasingly imposed patriarchal-violent (pre-bourgeois) methods of preserving the political system. The result was the primacy of the state and the apparatus of violence, a feature common to late feudal and Asian societies. Added to this were semi-serfdom, such as the lack of passports for collective farm workers and the requirement of residency registration, and semi-slavery, such as the widespread use of convict labor. These were all forms of economic organization with significant elements of patriarchy and great power chauvinism in their ideology. However, the energy of the socialist movement, both within the USSR and around the world, simultaneously limited the regression of Stalinism to pre-bourgeois institutions and provided the basis for the preservation and development of the country. Without this socialist impulse, the USSR collapsed in the 20th century as a completely non-socialist system.
One of the most prominent contemporary Russian leftist thinkers critical of Stalinism is the sociologist and publicist Boris Kagarlitsky, founder of the online journal Rabkor. He is currently in prison on political charges. Kagarlitsky was a left-wing dissident and staunch anti-Stalinist even during the Soviet era, viewing Stalinism as a corruption of the socialist project and a replacement of workers’ self-management with a totalitarian bureaucracy. His works analyzed the nature of the Soviet nomenklatura, showing how Stalinism led to the formation of a new class structure in which the party-state elite usurped power and suppressed the democratic elements integral to the early Soviet project.
Stalin’s Thermidor, like the French Thermidor, was essentially a counterrevolution that emerged from the revolution itself and is largely its continuation and culmination. For this reason, both attempts to separate Bolshevism from Stalinism and efforts to reduce Bolshevism to the precursor of Stalinism are equally misguided.
In 2011, the merger of two Trotskyist organizations — the Socialist Movement Forward and Socialist Resistance — created the Russian Socialist Movement (RSM). This organization became one of the few independent left-wing political forces in Russia committed to the principles of democratic socialism, attracting primarily students, young activists, and intellectuals. The RSM criticized both neoliberal capitalism and authoritarian tendencies within the Russian state, defended workers’ rights, and participated in protest campaigns. However, as repression against the opposition increased, the movement came under increasing pressure from the authorities. In 2024, after being designated a “foreign agent,” the organization decided to dissolve, dealing a significant blow to independent left-wing politics in Russia. This was one of the indications of the collapse of independent leftist politics in Russia.
In a post-Putin era, anti-Stalinist leftists could play a crucial role in reshaping the politics of history by offering an alternative interpretation of the Soviet past. Their perspective could challenge both the liberal narrative, which sees the October Revolution and the USSR solely as deviations from the European path of development, and the imperial discourse, which views the Soviet Union as just another manifestation of Russia’s millennia-old statehood. By developing their historical framework based on the critique of authoritarianism and the preservation of the revolutionary legacy, anti-Stalinist leftists could contribute to the formation of a new political identity free from the restoration of both liberal and national-conservative approaches.
This article was first published on Posle.