The protests that swept through China between May and early June 2025 highlight deep tensions and dynamics of growing instability in the country’s social fabric
A society under pressure: the overall picture of the protests
An analysis of the social protests that took place in China between late May and early June 2025 reveals a picture of systemic tensions across the entire country. Far from being isolated phenomena, these events highlight deep fractures in the current social situation in the country, where economic difficulties are intertwined with structural political problems and growing violations of fundamental rights.
The period examined, which symbolically culminates with the 36th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown on 4 June 1989, saw an extraordinary concentration of protests that, in just over a week, intensely affected various sectors of society: from manufacturing to construction, from education to healthcare, and even including the prison system. This rapid succession of cross-cutting mobilisations highlights how the causes of the unrest cannot be traced back to specific sectoral issues, but are rather caused by deeper systemic dynamics that are evolving simultaneously.
The eight “sample” days analysed in detail – from 26 May to 3 June – also reveal a geographical distribution that spans the entire country, from the industrial province of Guangdong to the north-eastern regions, highlighting how the phenomenon is not limited to certain economic areas, but represents a generalised manifestation of fractures in the contemporary Chinese social fabric.
The phenomenon of wage arrears: scale and characteristics
Wage arrears emerge as the common denominator in the vast majority of documented protests. According to data from the China Labour Bulletin, in 2024 as many as 88% of collective protests were related to non-payment, highlighting how this issue has become endemic in the Chinese economy. The organisation reports that “wage arrears account for 76% of events on the strike map since 2011”, indicating that the phenomenon has persisted for a decade.
The case of the Yunda Express workers’ protest in Chengdu illustrates the complexity of these dynamics and the ways in which conflicts develop and, sometimes, are resolved. The dispute, which lasted from 30 May to 2 June, arose not only from wage issues but also from the company’s unilateral decision to relocate its distribution centre to the city of Ziyang, Lezhi County, without offering compensation or alternative employment to employees affected by the relocation. The workers blocked the entrance to the distribution centre to prevent vehicles from entering and leaving, paralysing the company’s operations.
The chronicle of the protest reveals the escalation of tensions: during the night of 31 May, the police attempted to forcibly disperse the protesters, and according to workers’ testimonies, some employees were beaten during the intervention. After days of resistance and intense negotiations, the company finally agreed on 2 June to compensate employees according to a precise mathematical formula: average salary plus 6,000 yuan multiplied by years of service. This resolution shows how sustained collective pressure can still achieve concrete results in the Chinese context, albeit on rare occasions, despite the repressive environment.
The manufacturing sector has seen numerous disturbances reflecting the structural economic difficulties of the Chinese economy. For example, in Ningbo, Zhejiang, workers at Rockmoway Clothing mobilised for two consecutive days (2-3 June) to protest against the company’s decision to arbitrarily withhold 40% of their wages. Similarly, several factories have seen prolonged strikes over wage arrears, as in the case of the BASF construction sites in Donghai, Guangdong, where on 2 June construction workers downed tools to protest against non-payment of wages.
The geography of manufacturing protests shows a particular concentration in Guangdong province, the “engine” of the Chinese economy, which recorded 37 cases in April 2025, by far the highest number of any region. This concentration reflects growing pressures on export-oriented industries in a province that is the manufacturing heartland of China.
The impact of the trade war and changes in industrial work
The intensification of trade tensions between the United States and China has had direct and measurable effects on workers’ conditions. The expansion of US tariffs, which target goods produced by Chinese companies even in third countries, has amplified uncertainties and exacerbated the crisis facing workers. Data shows that the manufacturing sector has seen a significant increase in unrest, rising from 25 cases in March 2025 to 39 in April, reflecting growing pressures on export-oriented industries.
The protests have spread geographically “from Guangdong province in south-west China, where many manufacturing companies are located, to Tongliao in Jilin province in the north-east”, highlighting the nationwide distribution of the phenomenon. As noted by Workers’ Solidarity, “this also reflects the fact that the problems of the Chinese economic system extend to international activities”, with Chinese workers employed on overseas projects striking in Saudi Arabia and Oman on 29 May to demand their wages.
Particularly significant is the case of protests at Foxconn factories, one of the world’s largest manufacturers supplying iPhones to Apple. At the Hengyang factory, workers went on strike to protest against cuts in subsidies and overtime, while at the Taiyuan factory they protested against plans to transfer production facilities from Taiyuan to Jincheng, a three-hour drive away. Workers shouted “We want our rights respected!” during street demonstrations.
BYD, China’s leading electric car manufacturer, also faced significant unrest. On 28 March, more than 1,000 workers at the Wuxi plant went on strike to protest against wage cuts, the end of birthday bonuses and other subsidy cuts. A few days later, workers at the Chengdu plant also protested, demanding job security, transparency in relocation and fair compensation.
Among the various sectors, the clothing and footwear industry has been particularly affected by the crisis, with workers often suffering from unpaid wages. These industries are often small and concentrated in the same area, so non-payment of wages or suspension of activity due to declining profitability often occur in neighbouring locations at the same time. Among the manufacturing strikes in 2024, the clothing sector ranked second (90 cases) after the electrical and electronics sector (109 cases).
The ‘Brother 800’ case: a symbol of systemic despair
On 20 May 2025, the fire at the Sichuan Jinyu Textile Company factory in Pingshan County took on a symbolic significance that went far beyond the local dimension of the event. Wen, a 27-year-old worker, set fire to his workplace after being deprived of wages owed to him totalling 5,370 yuan, contrary to the 800 yuan initially reported by the media and subsequently denied by the police.
A reconstruction of the facts reveals the complexity of the dynamics that led to this extreme act. Wen had resigned on 30 April and, according to Article 9 of the Provisional Regulations on the Payment of Wages, should have received all outstanding wages immediately upon termination of employment. When he completed the resignation procedures on 15 May, the factory owed him 5,370 yuan (approximately 760 dollars). Wen requested immediate payment, but the finance department refused, citing internal approval procedures. After unsuccessfully requesting payment from his supervisor again, Wen developed what the police report describes as “thoughts of revenge”.
The fire caused economic damage estimated at tens of millions of yuan and led to the arrest of the perpetrator, but the story went viral on Chinese social media with the hashtag ‘Brother 800.’ The discrepancy between the 800 yuan initially reported and the 5,370 yuan actually fueled debates on social media, with many users expressing solidarity with Wen, considering him a “desperate hero” rather than a criminal.
This case highlights the structural ineffectiveness of legal protection mechanisms. As one witness ironically observed, “when those owed wages sought legal help, the judges disappeared, and the labour department staff also vanished. But when Wen set fire to the factory, the police arrived immediately and the magistrates reappeared.” Critics point out that the system reacts promptly to violations of public order but remains inert in the face of systematic violations of workers’ rights.
The description of Wen’s family circumstances, such as poverty, a sick mother and urgent need for money, illustrates how individual economic difficulties are intertwined with the absence of adequate social safety nets. The China Labour Bulletin emphasises that the incident represents “a breakdown in the legal and institutional systems designed to support workers”, highlighting the inadequacy of existing trade union structures, which “remained silent” throughout the entire affair.
The public reaction reflects widespread frustration with these systemic flaws. Online, a viral comment asked: “Why would a man resort to burning down a factory for 800 yuan? It means he was literally starving.” Others denounced the double standard: protesting workers are labelled as troublemakers, while employers who withhold wages are tolerated by the authorities.
The crisis in the construction and real estate sector: a downward spiral
The construction sector accounted for 54.48% of all collective protests in April 2025, a figure that reflects the ongoing crisis in the Chinese real estate market. This concentration in the construction sector highlights how the real estate crisis, which began with the Evergrande case in 2021 and spread throughout the entire sector, as well as to the wider economy, continues to have a devastating effect on working conditions.
Unfinished projects are a particular source of social tension, as they affect not only workers in the sector but also citizens who have invested their savings in buying homes. For example, in Xianyang, Shaanxi, on 30 May, owners of unfinished buildings in the Sunac Shiguang Chenyue project demonstrated in front of the local petition centre, accusing the government of misappropriating funds intended for construction, resulting in multiple arrests by law enforcement. In Qingdao, Shandong, hundreds of owners of the unfinished Heda Xingfucheng real estate project also organised a collective protest in Chengyang district on 31 May, blocking traffic and forcing their way into the construction site, with several proprietors suffering violence at the hands of the police.
These episodes highlight how the real estate crisis does not only affect operators in the sector, but also extends to middle-class citizens who have invested their savings in purchasing homes, creating a broader social base of potential discontent. The convergence between the economic crisis and disappointed social expectations represents a particularly destabilising factor for social stability.
The spread of protests to the public sector: teachers, doctors and healthcare workers
Particularly worrying for the authorities is the spread of protests to the public sector, traditionally considered more stable and loyal to the system. Contract teachers in Shandong province have not received salaries for six months, with one primary school teacher stating, “Our monthly salary is only about 3,000 yuan (just over 400 dollars), and for the past six months we have been living on borrowed money.”
Another teacher in Shanxi reported that his school was demanding the return of end-of-year bonuses previously paid to staff from 2021, along with part of the remuneration received for after-school activities. These measures have caused widespread discontent, as evidenced by posts on the social networking platform Xiaohongshu (RedNote).
Healthcare workers face similar problems. A nurse at a public hospital in the northwestern province of Gansu said her monthly salary is only 1,300 yuan (less than $200) and that her performance bonus has not been paid for four months. In Fuzhou, Jiangxi, on 7 April, doctors and nurses from Dongxin No. 6 Hospital gathered in front of the Fuzhou municipal government building, demanding payment of performance-related wages, which had been withheld for seven months.
As Zhang, a retired teacher from Guizhou University, observed: “In the past, it was migrant workers and factory workers who demanded wages, but now teachers, doctors and street cleaners are joining them. This shows that China’s ‘stable structure’ is beginning to unravel.” This observation captures a fundamental qualitative change: the spread of social discontent to traditionally privileged categories of the public sector indicates a crisis of legitimacy that goes beyond mere economic difficulties.
Human rights violations in the prison system: the testimony of Liu Xijie
The judicial and prison system has been the subject of particularly serious allegations that shed light on systematic abuses. Liu Xijie, originally from Bozhou in Anhui and detained from 2011 to 2024 in Fushun Prison No. 1 in Liaoning, has recently found the courage to publicly and nominally denounce systematic abuses by prison police, providing specific names of accused officers.
According to his detailed testimony, around February 2022, more than 200 prisoners suffered abuse of varying degrees, including electric torture with electric batons, insults and beatings for minor infractions such as non-compliant responses to regulations, inappropriate posture or improper folding of blankets. The testimony describes in particularly chilling detail how some prison officers allegedly took pleasure in the abuse, trampling on elderly inmates, inserting batons into inmates’ mouths, and electrocuting prisoners to the point of faecal incontinence.
The most serious case concerns Fan Hongyu, an inmate who died on 19 February 2022 after repeated torture for failing to memorise prison regulations. This testimony, made public at a time of particular social tension, highlights how the repressive system uses methods that systematically violate fundamental human rights, contributing to the general climate of oppression that fuels social discontent.
Student protests: the case of Xuchang and the memory of Tiananmen
An analysis of student movements reveals particularly significant dynamics. On 3 June in Changning, Hunan province, hundreds of high school students from Shangyu School organised a spontaneous demonstration on campus to relieve the stress of university entrance exams. The event, initially peaceful and characterised by cries of liberation, quickly took on political connotations when the school alerted the authorities to the excessive enthusiasm shown by the young people.
When the police intervened and arrested three alleged organisers, the situation quickly degenerated, with students forming a human wall to prevent the police cars from leaving, shouting slogans such as “withdraw from school, give us our money back” and demanding the release of their arrested classmates. Despite their determination, the officers managed to break through the student cordon using force, taking the three young people away under the helpless gaze of their classmates.
The episode is particularly sensitive given its proximity to the anniversary of 4 June 1989, a date that continues to be a moment of extreme sensitivity for the Chinese authorities. In the case of Xuchang No. 6 Middle School in Henan, where a female student committed suicide allegedly due to bullying by her teacher, thousands of students and citizens protested in front of the school, entering the campus and damaging offices before the police intervened. Wu Jianzhong, secretary-general of the Taiwan Strategy Association, notes that because the incident occurred close to a sensitive date such as 4 June, the authorities reacted with extreme caution, fearing that it could trigger social unrest and spread rapidly, like wildfire.
Social control and repression: the anniversary of Tiananmen
In the context of the 36th anniversary of Tiananmen, the authorities implemented unprecedented control measures against the group known as the “Tiananmen Mothers”. For the first time in the group’s history, all their communications with the outside world were cut off, with a ban on carrying mobile phones and cameras during the commemoration at the Wan’an Cemetery in Haidian.
On 31 May, the Tiananmen Mothers released an open letter signed by 108 relatives of the victims, commemorating the members who had died in the past year and reiterating their demands: to investigate the event impartially, publish the names of the dead, compensate the families and punish those responsible. Zhang Xianling, 87, was moved to tears in a video a few days ago: “For 36 years, we have repeatedly sought dialogue with the authorities, but we have only been monitored and repressed.”
This escalation in control highlights the authorities’ particular sensitivity to any form of collective memory linked to the events of 1989, suggesting a perception of vulnerability on the part of the regime with regard to potential connections between contemporary protests and historical precedents of social mobilisation.
Digital censorship and information control
The handling of information about the protests reveals sophisticated strategies for controlling public discourse. In the case of the Xuchang No. 6 Middle School incident, the authorities quickly removed all content posted on social media, and the discussion thread about Xuchang No. 6 Middle School on the social network Weibo disappeared. When students realised that their messages could not circulate, they had no choice but to vent their frustration against the school itself, eventually leading to an open confrontation.
At the same time, Chinese cyberspace showed abnormal reactions. In early June, in Tencent’s game “Golden Spatula Wars”, all WeChat user avatars were uniformly changed to green penguins and could not be changed, which attracted widespread attention from players. One internet user complained on Platform X: “Penguins were originally a symbol of entertainment, but now they have become a mask of censorship.”
In addition, as every year around 4 June, Chinese social media platforms block keywords such as “square”, “tank”, “8964”, and related content is immediately deleted, while accounts that posted them risk being banned. On 4 June, human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang was warned by the police to delete his commemorative speech on X.
Effective resistance dynamics: the case of Dongguan
Despite authoritarian control, several episodes demonstrate how social mobilisation retains the ability to influence local authorities’ decisions when it reaches significant proportions and puts forward concrete economic demands. The case of Dongguan is an emblematic example of spontaneous and successful worker mobilisation.
On 2 June, hundreds of migrant workers living in Yangyong village, in the city of Dalang, opposed the introduction of a toll system that they considered economically unsustainable. Their collective action, which began around 6 p.m. with the blocking of toll barriers, saw growing participation until it reached several hundred people shouting slogans such as “remove the barriers”.
Under sustained pressure from the protesters, at around 10 p.m. the social stability police had to give in, sending workers to remove all the toll equipment. The taxation policy, implemented just the day before, was declared null and void, highlighting how economic difficulties are pushing the working classes towards increasingly organised and effective forms of resistance.
Evolution of protest strategies and social organisation
Analysis reveals an evolution in the ways protests are organised, reflecting the adaptation of social movements to the contemporary technological and repressive environment. In the case of the Xuchang students, the use of mobile phones and the internet allowed for rapid connection and aggregation, highlighting how digital technologies can act as multipliers of collective action despite government controls.
Zeng Jianyuan, executive director of the Chinese Democratic Academic Association in Taiwan, observes that “in the current climate of repressive government and political purges in China, only apolitical issues can gain legitimacy for large-scale collective aggregation.” However, he adds that “the Chinese Communist Party clearly perceives that this turmoil is not just a gesture of support for a school or a single incident, but also reflects two deeper problems.”
The first problem, according to Zeng, is that “under Xi Jinping’s administration, Chinese society is experiencing a wave of collective emotional unrest, and many are looking for an outlet.” The second is that “the Xuchang incident reveals a loosening of social control by local authorities: students were able to quickly coordinate and gather thanks to mobile phones and the Internet, a sign of the failure of local stability maintenance mechanisms.”
It is clear that the most recent protests cannot be interpreted simply as spontaneous reactions to specific injustices, but rather represent manifestations of a broader “collective emotional distress” seeking channels of expression through seemingly non-political issues.
Legitimacy crisis of local authorities
The protests documented highlight a growing legitimacy crisis among local authorities, who are unable to effectively mediate between central economic pressures and local social needs. The arbitrary imposition of taxes at the local level is a prime example of this dynamic.
In the case of Pingtang village in Gushan town, Zhejiang province, the village committee issued a notice announcing that, starting on 10 May, “health management fees” and “parking fees” would be levied on all permanent residents and workers in the village: 80 yuan per year for adults, 40 yuan for children, and 500 yuan for cars and tricycles. The notice also stated that those who did not pay on time would be “put under control” from 1 June, and each person would have to pay an additional 200-100 yuan, their vehicles would be blocked, and those who broke the locks would be “treated as perpetrators of vandalism against public property.”
Li, a tenant in the village, testified that “this fee was never agreed upon with the villagers, nor was it discussed at a public meeting. I am an outside tenant and have never heard of the village meeting approving this fee.” Some residents criticised the village committee’s move as “blatant extortion”. Another resident, Zhang Shun (pseudonym), said: “There are five people in my family, and we have to pay 400 yuan a year. We can’t afford it at all. Is this still a country ruled by the Communist Party?” Jia Lingmin, an activist, pointed out that the village committee is a grassroots autonomous organisation, and all taxes must obtain a “tax permit”, otherwise they are illegal.
This episode illustrates how local governments, under pressure from fiscal difficulties, are resorting to increasingly desperate and illegal measures to raise funds, further eroding their legitimacy in the eyes of the population. As noted by Zhang, a retired teacher from Guizhou University: “High local debt and tightening central policies have had a major impact on local fiscal management. The most direct victims are permanent and contract workers.”
Transformations in the Chinese social fabric
Tang Gang, a Sichuan scholar, offers a particularly insightful analysis of the social transformations underway, observing how Chinese society is evolving “from a traditional society where it was possible to find compromises, tolerate each other and coexist, to a society marked by harsh conflicts, where positions are irreconcilable and coexistence becomes impossible.” This transformation, which he attributes to the changes of the last ten years under Xi Jinping’s leadership, suggests a qualitative deterioration in social relations that transcends specific economic issues.
Xue, a researcher in the field of labour relations in Guizhou, identifies several factors contributing to the intensification of conflicts between workers and employers. “First, in some companies, union leaders are appointed directly by the employers, which prevents the union from truly representing the interests of workers. This hinders the defence of employees’ rights and fuels tensions. Secondly, the relationship between capital and labour is strongly market-oriented, but there is a lack of equitable income distribution. Furthermore, in many factories, there is a lack of transparency in the management of issues affecting workers, further exacerbating contradictions.”
Xue’s analysis highlights how the problems are not simply economic but reflect structural deficiencies in the Chinese industrial relations system. The absence of independent and representative trade unions leaves workers without effective channels for conflict resolution, forcing them to resort to increasingly direct and, at times, extreme forms of protest.
Towards scenarios of growing instability
The accumulation of tensions documented in the period from late May to early June 2025 alone indicates that today’s China faces systemic social challenges that cannot be resolved through the repressive mechanisms traditionally employed by the regime alone. The cross-sectoral nature of the protests, their nationwide geographical spread and the involvement of traditionally stable groups such as teachers and healthcare workers show that the current difficulties are not cyclical fluctuations but rather manifestations of deeper structural contradictions.
The limited capacity of local authorities to respond effectively to popular demands, combined with the growing economic despair of large sections of the population, creates potentially explosive conditions. As highlighted by the “Brother 800” case, when legal channels for conflict resolution prove ineffective, citizens may resort to increasingly extreme and destructive forms of protest.
The intensification of repressive measures, visible in the isolation of the Tiananmen Mothers and the rapid censorship of protest incidents, indicates a perception of vulnerability on the part of the regime that could paradoxically fuel further tensions. The strategy of controlling information, while effective in the short term, risks fuelling frustration and radicalisation when citizens discover the impossibility of communicating their grievances through institutional channels.
The Chinese authorities seem to find themselves in an increasingly difficult position, forced to balance the demands of social control with the need to maintain economic stability. The experience of the short period analysed suggests that this tension is reaching critical thresholds, with implications that could extend far beyond the boundaries of the single episode or sector involved.
Sources: Yesterday, Radio Free Asia, China Labour Bulletin, AsiaNews, Workers’ Solidarity
Andrea Ferrario is an Italian international politics blogger with a focus on East Asia. He has collaborated with the weekly magazine Internazionale and is co-editor of the website Crisi Globale.
The Italian original of this article was first published on the author’s Substack. This English translation, by Daniel Mang, was first published on the Left Renewal Blog.
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