From Atar: Sudan in Perspective

The Haftar-Hemedti nexus rests on a shared ideology that scorns centralised state authority in favour of personal loyalty networks and informal economies.
Sudan’s western frontier has become a tinderbox, where overlapping regional agendas are no longer negotiated in diplomatic backrooms but played out with bullets, gold, and tangled loyalties. At the centre of this volatile tableau stands the unspoken alliance between Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and eastern Libya’s militia leader Khalifa Haftar. Both men emerged from the margins of political geography, each determined to extend his influence across two neighbouring states teetering on the brink of collapse.
Here, we map the strands of their cross-border partnership through the so-called Border Triangle, a once-overlooked sandy domain now transformed into a regional battleground stretching from Darfur to Benghazi. Long relegated to a cartographic footnote between Sudan, Libya, and Egypt, the Triangle has, since war erupted in Sudan, morphed into a strategic flashpoint and a perilous corridor for arms, fighters, and gold. The territory lies south of Egypt’s Siwa Oasis, west of Al Uwaynat, and north-west of Sudan. It now hosts multiple armed networks.
Meeting at El Alamein: A stormy diplomatic confrontation
In late June 2025, the Egyptian city of El Alamein became the stage for a heated diplomatic showdown when Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan sat down with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, just as Khalifa Haftar and his son Saddam arrived on an officially announced visit. Though media images conveyed separate discussions, intelligence contacts and a Middle East Eye exposé reveal that the summit served as a covert face-off between Burhan and Haftar.
A senior Sudanese sovereign source told Atar that Burhan pressed al-Sisi on the north-western border dossier, presenting documents he claimed proved Haftar’s military and logistical backing for Hemedti’s RSF. A Sudanese intelligence informant, speaking to Middle East Eye, described a network smuggling weapons and drones through southern Libya, with transit facilitated from the Maatan al-Sarra base in Kufra. Burhan also recounted a previous Khartoum visit by Haftar’s son, Sadiq, who met Hemedti and donated $2 million to Al Merrikh Sporting Club.
That meeting reportedly escalated into a sharp confrontation after Burhan accused Haftar of funnelling arms from southern Libya into Darfur and alleged coordination with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), citing leaks that Maatan al-Sarra served as a military supply waypoint. Haftar vehemently denied all allegations, but Burhan insisted he possessed concrete proof. Egypt’s official posture remained muted, though al-Sisi is said to have bristled at the encounter’s intensity.
June 2025 shifts
In June 2025, the RSF declared full control of the Border Triangle after the SAF and its allied units withdrew. The SAF characterised the pullback as a defensive measure to repel aggression, accusing the RSF of coordinating an attack on its frontier posts with direct backing from Haftar-aligned Libyan forces, specifically the Salafi Brigade. In response, the Foreign Ministry loyal to General Haftar denied any involvement, dismissing the accusations as an effort to export Sudan’s crisis.
An RSF insider said that securing the Triangle was part of a military tactic aimed at opening new supply lines and recalibrating relations with Egypt, particularly following Hemedti’s speech, which hinted at possible dialogue with Cairo.
RSF control of this remote region has raised serious questions about the value of this stretch of desert, located south of Egypt’s Siwa Oasis, west of Al Uwaynat, and north-west of Sudan. Though barren, its geography positions it as a vital juncture among three nations and a strategic corridor for desert routes, smuggling, and irregular migration. It is also believed to contain untapped mineral deposits, notably gold, adding an economic dimension to its significance.
More content from this blog
- “New McCarthyism” Petition Illustrates Western Leftists’ Failure of Internationalism, by Brian Hioe – 8 August 2023
- How Thailand and India continue to fail Myanmar refugees, by Makepeace Sitlhou – 16 August 2024
- Patriarchy, Policy, and Nationhood – 23 October 2025
- Demographic Fever Dreams: Fragile Masculinity and Population Politics in the Rise of the Global Right, by Banu Gökarıksel, Christopher Neubert, and Sara Smith – 1 March 2019
- What US Funding Cuts Mean for Fight Against Rising NCD Burden. Interview with Katie Dain – 20 February 2025