on proxy-war arguments, class solidarity, and what happens when revolutionary theory loses contact with the people it’s supposed to liberate
On April 27, 2022, Russian troops used tear gas and stun grenades against people protesting the occupation of Kherson. And it wasn’t the first time as they had already fired into the air during demonstrations a month earlier.
In the years since, we’ve seen exactly what Russian occupation means for the people forced to live under it. Residents have been pressured into accepting Russian passports, with access to healthcare, employment, and social benefits increasingly dependent on Russian citizenship. Those suspected of opposing the occupation face imprisonment, torture, and enforced disappearance. In Mariupol, Russian authorities have confiscated thousands of homes belonging to displaced Ukrainians, transferring seized apartments to new residents while actively encouraging Russian citizens to relocate to the occupied city. It’s difficult to ignore the settler-colonial character of a process in which Ukrainians are driven from their homes, prevented from returning, and replaced by people from the occupying state. Yet the theory that Ukrainian military defeat is supposed to open the way to revolution seems entirely uninterested in any of these realities. How exactly were the people protesting in Kherson supposed to build a solidarity movement with members of an invading army that was already violently suppressing their resistance?
The First World War comes up quickly in many Marxist-Leninist arguments about Ukraine, often before you hear much about Ukraine or Ukrainians themselves. At this point, we’re all used to these takes from them and and various Communist parties. But anarchists aren’t immune to such myopic or selective understandings of Ukrainian reality. In a September 2026 essay for Sardegna Anarchica, Sardinian anarchist Erika Canè returns to the dispute over Kropotkin and the 1916 Manifesto of the Sixteen, when anarchists argued over support for the Allies. Canè treats anarchists who fight the Russian invasion within Ukraine’s armed forces as heirs to that old betrayal. It’s a clever historical comparison, provided you can get through it without asking what alternatives those Ukrainian anarchists have, or what happens to them and everyone around them if the Russian army wins. It’s a point seemingly irrelevant to Canè and others who frantically point to revolutionary defeatism as the only true solution to an imperial invasion.
what 1914 is supposed to prove
In 2025, Fight For a Future (among other western social media entities) invoked the collapse of the Second International’s opposition to war in 1914, compared defenses of Ukrainian resistance to socialist justifications for joining the First World War, and called for mutinies and independent soldiers’ and workers’ councils on both sides. While the article does acknowledge Russia’s full-scale invasion and takes aim at pro-Kremlin campism, it also dismisses asking “who started it” as “moralizing” and calls the war an “objective necessity” for both ruling classes.
A Ukrainian capitalist can make money from a war their own government had every reason to repel. That gives us a reason to investigate war profiteering. Explaining the invasion takes evidence about who had the power to order it and what they set out to do. The people who made that decision could move an army across a border and install their own authorities in the towns it captured. To dismiss asking who did that as moralizing or default to symmetrizing an invasion is an odd way to write about class power.
Lenin’s 1915 defense of revolutionary defeatism called for action against one’s own government in an imperialist war, even where that action contributed to its military defeat. He wanted revolutionaries to build that struggle in the circumstances they faced and rejected waiting for a formal agreement on when everybody would act. In Socialism and War, Lenin and Grigory Zinoviev distinguished a war between imperial powers from a war against national subjugation. Their examples of the latter included hypothetical wars by India against Britain and Persia against Russia. Lenin and Zinoviev also explicitly condemned Russia’s imperial ambitions during the First World War, pointing to the tsarist government’s intention to seize Galicia and crush Ukrainian liberties. Even in their defense of revolutionary defeatism, they recognized Russia’s long-standing efforts to subjugate Ukrainians.
Fight For a Future draws a comparison with Belgium during the First World War, arguing that leftists who support Ukrainian resistance today are repeating the arguments British socialists used to justify fighting Germany in 1914. But this comparison overlooks an important distinction that Lenin and Zinoviev themselves made. They acknowledged that socialists could sympathize with a war fought to liberate Belgium from German occupation, while still opposing Britain’s and France’s participation in the wider war because those governments were pursuing their own imperialist ambitions, including the acquisition of German colonies. In other words, they recognized that an occupied country’s struggle for liberation could be legitimate even when powerful countries supporting it had ulterior motives. Their analysis required examining the actual objectives of the different parties involved, rather than assuming that everyone fighting on the same side was fighting for the same reasons.
who speaks for donbas?
One of the more frustrating aspects of the revolutionary defeatism debate is how frequently it relies on a deeply distorted account of what actually happened in eastern Ukraine before February 2022. You encounter the familiar story of a civil war that erupted after Maidan, an allegedly persecuted Russian population fighting for independence, and a Ukrainian government supposedly waging war against its own people. Sometimes the account goes further, borrowing from the Kremlin’s allegations of genocide in Donbas. These claims don’t all originate with advocates of revolutionary defeatism, and plenty of antiwar leftists reject Russia’s justification for invading. But the civil war narrative has found a remarkably comfortable home in certain Marxist-Leninist arguments about why Ukrainian workers should refuse to fight.
In a March 2022 statement, the International Marxist Tendency described the earlier fighting as a “civil war between the Russian-speaking people of the Donbas and the right-wing nationalist regime in Kiev.” It acknowledged Russian military participation but presented the conflict primarily as a confrontation between the Ukrainian government and a Russian-speaking population that had apparently developed a common political interest in opposing it. It’s an extraordinarily sweeping claim about a region of millions of people, particularly when you consider how little the available evidence supports such an absolutist stance.
Yes, there was hostility toward the post-Maidan government in parts of eastern Ukraine. Some people supported separation from Ukraine, others wanted greater regional autonomy, and many had complicated relationships with both Kyiv and Moscow. Those differences are precisely why the claim that Donbas was a united Russian population fighting for independence deserves closer scrutiny.
According to Ukraine’s 2001 census, ethnic Ukrainians constituted 56.9% of Donetsk oblast’s population and 58% of Luhansk oblast’s population. Ethnic Russians accounted for approximately 38.2% and 39.1%, respectively. These are the last comprehensive census figures available before the war, and demographics have subsequently changed dramatically through displacement, migration, and deaths. But they establish something important about the population before Russian intervention: even in the two oblasts most frequently portrayed as inherently Russian, ethnic Ukrainians were the majority.
And ethnicity alone tells us very little about what people wanted politically. A March 2014 survey by Rating Group found that approximately one-third of respondents in Donetsk and Luhansk supported separating Donbas from Ukraine, while 56% opposed it. The same survey found that 59% of respondents in Donbas favored federalization, which would have given the region greater autonomy while remaining part of Ukraine. These were divided political preferences, hardly an overwhelming mandate for secession.
A separate Pew Research Center survey, conducted in April 2014, found that 70% of respondents across eastern Ukraine favored maintaining the country’s unity. The survey covered a broader eastern region, rather than Donbas alone, but it doesn’t support the story of an eastern population united behind separation.
A September 2014 survey found that greater autonomy within Ukraine was the most common preference among respondents in Donetsk. Fighting prevented equivalent polling in Luhansk. Those preferences deserved to be taken seriously. Demands for local autonomy, criticism of Kyiv, support for bilingualism, and opposition to a particular government are legitimate political positions. But again, they don’t automatically amount to support for annexation.
The armed takeover also had a Russian organizer from the outset. On April 12, 2014, a group led by Igor Girkin, a former officer of Russia’s FSB security service, seized government and police buildings in Sloviansk. Local separatists were involved, but the European Court of Human Rights found that Russia exercised effective control over separatist-held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk from May 11, 2014, through its military presence and decisive military, political, and economic support. In its 2025 judgment, the Court described the Russian operations launched that spring as planned and coordinated by Russian authorities. That leaves plenty of room to discuss genuine local grievances, but considerably less room to present the fighting as a spontaneous civil war with Russia just watching from across the border.
And that brings us to the persistent habit of treating Russian speakers as though they’re a separate community with a natural allegiance to Moscow.
Russian is widely spoken throughout southern and eastern Ukraine, including among people who identify unequivocally as Ukrainian. Many Ukrainians are bilingual, and millions grew up speaking Russian with family while considering Ukraine their homeland. Even among respondents in eastern Ukraine who reported speaking only Russian, Pew found that attitudes toward Moscow were divided: 41% viewed Russia’s influence positively, while 44% viewed it negatively. Nearly six in ten Russian-only speakers in the eastern survey region supported keeping Ukraine united.
Consider Kharkiv and Mariupol, two predominantly Russian-speaking cities that became major sites of resistance to Russian aggression and occupation. Even the original Azov Battalion drew much of its early membership from eastern Ukraine and used Russian as its primary language. It’s a rather inconvenient detail for anyone insisting that Russian-speaking Ukrainians naturally identify as “Russian.”
It’s also worth asking why Russian is so widely spoken in Ukraine in the first place. The country’s linguistic composition didn’t emerge in a historical vacuum. It was shaped by centuries of imperial expansion, population movements, urbanization, and policies that privileged Russian while suppressing Ukrainian language and culture. The Russian Empire’s Valuev Circular of 1863 restricted the publication of Ukrainian-language texts, while the Ems Ukaz of 1876 imposed further restrictions on Ukrainian publications and cultural activities. Soviet language policy varied over time, including an early period of Ukrainization, but later policies favored Russian in education, administration, and professional life, contributing to the assimilation of Ukrainian-speaking communities. Ukrainian writer and researcher Milena Khomchenko, who grew up in Donetsk oblast, has written about how these policies shaped the linguistic identity of the region and how Russia subsequently exploited that history to claim authority over Russian-speaking Ukrainians.
The tendency to treat Russian-speaking Ukrainians as a population naturally belonging to Russia also helps explain how another piece of Kremlin propaganda gained traction: the allegation that Ukraine was committing genocide in Donbas. Moscow spent years presenting itself as the protector of a persecuted Russian-speaking population, eventually using claims of genocide to justify its full-scale invasion in February 2022. The accusation has since circulated well beyond openly pro-Kremlin circles, including among people on the Western left who describe the fighting in Donbas as a campaign by the Ukrainian government against its own population. But in its March 16, 2022 provisional measures order, the International Court of Justice stated that it had no evidence before it substantiating Russia’s allegation of genocide on Ukrainian territory. The Court also expressed doubt that the Genocide Convention could authorize one state to invade another unilaterally on the stated grounds of preventing genocide.
Thousands of civilians had died in the conflict between 2014 and 2021. According to the UN Human Rights Office, at least 3,404 civilian deaths were recorded, including the 298 passengers and crew aboard flight MH17 (which was shot down by Russian-backed forces). Those deaths were real, and violations committed by Ukrainian forces deserved investigation and accountability, just as those committed by Russian-backed armed groups did. But civilian casualties in an armed conflict do not, by themselves, establish genocide. And the Kremlin’s supposed humanitarian concern for Donbas becomes considerably harder to take seriously when its chosen response was to launch an invasion aimed at Kyiv, attempt to overthrow Ukraine’s government, and claim additional Ukrainian territory as its own.
This history has direct implications for the arguments of those advocating revolutionary defeatism. If you begin with a supposedly spontaneous “civil war” against a persecuted Russian-speaking population and treat Russia’s intervention as an afterthought, you miss who already controlled the separatist authorities and what its victory would mean for Ukrainian workers. The people whose political choices were being narrowed by Russian intervention cannot simply be assigned a revolutionary future by someone arguing from abroad.
what “no war but class war” would require
A February 2022 statement signed by anarchist groups including Britain’s Anarchist Communist Group answered the invasion with “no war but class war.” The principle of internationalist class struggle is entirely valid. Workers should organize across borders against exploitation, militarism, and the governments that serve their ruling classes. But applying the same slogan to both sides of this war ignores what military defeat would actually mean for Ukrainian workers. Russian soldiers withdrawing or refusing to fight would undermine the Kremlin’s ability to occupy Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian soldiers doing the same could leave more workers and communities under Russian occupation, where independent organizing, political dissent, and labor rights face severe repression. Even a successful workers’ revolution against the government in Kyiv would still have to deal with the Russian army advancing into Ukrainian territory, including soldiers who genuinely believe in the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions.
Canè lists total desertion, revolutionary defeatism, and sabotage among the possible practices for anarchists facing war, occupation, or colonial domination. She regards armed revolutionary action as legitimate, so this is no plea for everybody to lay down their weapons and hope for peace. Yet she never gets much closer to answering the practical question. Desertion from Russia’s invading army and desertion from Ukraine’s defending army could have very different consequences for the people living in the next town on Russia’s route of advance. Sabotage could undermine the military force carrying out the conquest, or the force holding it back. The Russian anarchist collective Autonomous Action recognizes this distinction, urging Russians to evade conscription and desert the army while explicitly supporting Ukrainian anti-authoritarians who have taken up arms against the invasion. Those differences deserve more than a lazy lecture about how all states are oppressive from 2600 km away. You can oppose both governments and still recognize that helping one army lose may help the other impose its rule.
Fight For a Future points to the 2023 Wagner mutiny as evidence that the conditions for a workers’ revolution already exist in Russia and Ukraine. It’s honestly a bizarre example for anyone advocating internationalist class solidarity. Wagner was a mercenary organization with deep neo-Nazi connections, including its original commander, Dmitry Utkin, who openly displayed Nazi SS tattoos. Its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, a mercenary boss whose forces helped carry out Russia’s invasion, turned against the military leadership in a power struggle over control of his organization. His fighters were following their commander, not organizing workers’ councils or demanding an end to Russian imperialism. It takes some impressive ideological gymnastics to mistake a mercenary warlord’s armed tantrum for the beginnings of proletarian revolution. The mutiny exposed divisions within Russia’s military establishment, certainly, but how exactly does that translate into a revolutionary strategy for Ukrainian workers facing an invading army?
When I shared polling on how Russians felt about the war and about Ukrainians, people accused me of being against internationalism, as though acknowledging the political attitudes of an actual population were somehow incompatible with believing in international solidarity. I wanted to know where this remarkable confidence came from in the Disney-esque idea that Russian and Ukrainian soldiers were going to put aside their differences, embrace one another, and march off together to overthrow their officers. Because there’s an awful lot you miss when you can’t understand what Russian television is telling its audience about Ukraine, read what Russians are saying among themselves online, or follow how they discuss the war in everyday life. If your understanding of Russian society comes primarily from other Western leftists writing in English, perhaps you should spend a little more time listening to people who actually understand the region before confidently explaining to them that they’ve got Russians all wrong.
And the polling makes for some uncomfortable reading if your revolutionary strategy depends on widespread Russian opposition to the invasion. According to the Levada Center’s October 2026 survey, 69% of respondents supported the Russian military’s actions in Ukraine, while only 21% expressed opposition. Support has fluctuated throughout the war, but it has remained substantial despite years of casualties, sanctions, economic disruption, and increasingly direct consequences for Russian society. In January 2026, 64% of respondents expressed an unfavorable attitude toward Ukraine, compared with just 16% who viewed the country positively.
It’s true that growing numbers of Russians have expressed a preference for peace negotiations, but what they mean by peace deserves considerably more scrutiny. In October 2026, Levada found that 65% favored moving toward negotiations, even as 69% continued to support the military’s actions. In a separate September 2026 survey experiment, 81% said they would support Putin’s decision to end the war immediately. But when respondents were presented with the prospect of ending the war while returning annexed Ukrainian territories, support fell to 35%. Wanting the war to end and wanting Russia to give back what it has taken by force are two very different propositions.
The demands Russians associate with peace are equally revealing. A February 2026 Russian Field survey found that 75% considered recognition of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics as Russian territory a mandatory condition of a peace agreement. Another 71% insisted that Ukraine abandon its aspirations to join NATO, while 70% wanted Western sanctions lifted. In a separate Levada survey from February 2025, 73% considered installing a Russia-friendly government in Kyiv a desirable peace condition, and 70% favored reducing or demilitarizing Ukraine’s armed forces. These are political preferences that have to be taken seriously. A population can be exhausted by a war, resent its costs, and want the fighting to stop while still believing that its country has the right to dictate another nation’s borders, government, and military capabilities. War fatigue does not automatically produce anti-imperialism, much less revolutionary consciousness.
Of course, polling in an authoritarian country has limitations. People have good reasons to give answers they believe are safe, and expressed support for military operations doesn’t tell us how enthusiastically someone supports them or what they would be willing to sacrifice. A 2022 study by Chapkovski and Schaub found that support for the invasion was lower when measured indirectly than when respondents were asked outright, suggesting that publicly expressed support could be inflated to some degree. But acknowledging these limitations is rather different from assuming that an enormous supply of revolutionary internationalism must be hiding beneath the surface, just waiting for Ukrainian workers to make contact with it.
The differences in political outlook are visible even within families. A woman from Kharkiv told Meduza in March 2022 that she and her sister in Russia had spoken regularly before the invasion. When she sent her footage from the city, her sister responded that Ukraine was getting what it deserved. She pleaded with her to compare the videos with what she was seeing on Russian television. Here was a woman struggling to convince her own sister to believe her about the destruction taking place in her city, while certain Western leftists were confidently championing the hypothetical spontaneous fraternization of Russian and Ukrainian soldiers as a realistic revolutionary strategy.
None of this means that Russian workers are incapable of solidarity with Ukrainians. There are Russians who oppose the war, including anarchists, socialists, feminists, independent journalists, and ordinary people who have risked their freedom to actively resist it. Their experiences deserve far more attention than they usually receive in discussions about revolutionary defeatism. But internationalism requires understanding the political conditions under which solidarity might actually develop, including the influence of nationalist propaganda and the material incentives associated with military service.
In Canè’s account, forced conscription, far-right fighters, and restrictions on civil liberties under martial law are enough to dismiss the description of Ukrainian resistance as a popular struggle. Those are serious problems, and Ukrainian leftists have every reason to confront them. But the existence of conscription doesn’t make the volunteers imaginary. Nor does the presence of the far right tell us what every Ukrainian fighting Russia believes, or why they took up arms. People can oppose coercive mobilization, demand the restoration of civil liberties, and recognize the danger of far-right organizing while also refusing to hand their towns and communities over to an occupying army. I don’t see how their situation becomes easier to understand by insisting they must choose between opposing their own state and resisting the state invading them.
Canè’s treatment of Anarchist Black Cross Belarus in her essay is also worth mentioning here. In 2026, the collective was denied a table and a talk at the anarchist book fair in Bremgarten, Switzerland. The organizers said they could not reach a consensus over admitting a group that supports anti-authoritarians serving in the Ukrainian army. Canè portrays the Belarusian anarchists’ position as delusional and their response to the exclusion as self-pity. Meanwhile, ABC Belarus explained that losing access to events like this made it harder to raise money for Belarusian political prisoners, 15 of whom it was supporting at the time. These are people whose experience of state repression extends well beyond an argument about its correct theoretical definition.
Read ABC Belarus’s own position on the invasion and you’ll find a critique of the Ukrainian state, a warning against the rise of nationalism, and a frankly stated concern that a Russian victory would strengthen the dictatorships crushing anarchist movements in Belarus and Russia. Their support for armed resistance is a difficult, temporary choice made under conditions they describe in detail. Canè can disagree with that choice, as can anyone else. But dismissing it as a failure of anarchist principles is a convenient way to avoid addressing their argument about what defeat would actually mean for movements trying to survive in the region.
And the Russian anti-war movement provides another reality check. While polling reveals substantial support for the military campaign, the people attempting to organize against it face severe consequences. A September 2026 CrimethInc report, based on a presentation by Finnish anarchist Antti Rautiainen, documents the repression of Russian anarchists and anti-fascists, including the cases of Aleksandr Snezhkov and Lyubov Lizunova, who were just 19 and 16 when arrested in 2022 over alleged anti-regime graffiti and anarchist Telegram activity. They received sentences of 6 years and 3.5 years, respectively. The report also describes how Anarchist Black Cross Moscow, which was supporting 23 anarchist and anti-fascist political prisoners, was effectively forced to move its operations abroad after Russian authorities designated it an “undesirable” organization in 2025, making even donations potentially punishable by imprisonment.
These people are attempting to challenge the Russian state under conditions that can cost them years of their lives. International solidarity means backing them, their families, and the organizations providing legal support. And if revolutionary defeatism depends on an independent antiwar movement growing powerful enough to obstruct the Kremlin’s war machine, its advocates need to reckon with that repression rather than asking Ukrainian workers to gamble their survival on an uprising that has yet to materialize.
whose imperialist war is this, exactly?
By the time some sections of the Western left get around to describing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an “inter-imperialist war,” they’ve generally already decided what the answer to every practical question should be. Both sides are capitalist, both governments serve their respective ruling classes, NATO has expanded eastward, and the United States has spent decades pursuing its own imperial interests. These are all subjects up for discussion and I’d likely agree with a lot of it. But identifying the interests of capitalist governments is hardly the same as explaining a war, and I’m increasingly tired of watching people act as though listing every objectionable thing NATO has ever done constitutes a serious analysis of Russian imperialism.
An inter-imperialist war, in the classical Marxist understanding, involves competing imperialist powers fighting over territory, markets, resources, and spheres of influence. There are certainly competing interests surrounding Ukraine: Russia seeks to dominate its neighbors, while Washington and European governments have strategic and economic objectives of their own. Military assistance creates dependencies, and Ukraine’s reconstruction attracts investors eager to profit. But identifying these interests still leaves you with the task of explaining the invasion itself.
Ukraine is a capitalist state with an oligarchic legacy, serious inequalities, and a government that has undermined labor protections during wartime. Ukrainian workers have every reason to fight against those policies. They also have every reason to oppose a foreign government that openly challenges their country’s sovereignty and has demonstrated what happens to dissent in territories under its control. The existence of Ukrainian capitalism doesn’t somehow cancel out Russian imperialism, and I have no idea why this apparently needs endless explaining to people who pride themselves on their sophisticated understanding of power.
The Communist Party of Greece’s 2022 resolution offers a particularly frustrating example. The party condemns Russia’s invasion and even acknowledges that defending territorial integrity against foreign occupation can constitute a just struggle. Yet it characterizes the war as a conflict between imperialist blocs and opposes supplying Ukraine with military equipment. So what exactly are Ukrainians supposed to do when an invading army arrives? They’re entitled to resist occupation in principle, but the practical means of doing so become objectionable when those weapons come from NATO countries. I would genuinely like to know what alternative the party envisions, because the Russian army is unlikely to suspend its advance while Ukrainian workers work out how to reconcile their immediate survival with somebody else’s interpretation of Lenin.
And the weapons themselves seem to cause a peculiar intellectual malfunction. The moment Western governments supply Ukraine with military assistance, some leftists begin treating Ukrainian resistance as though it has been absorbed entirely into Washington’s geopolitical objectives. Of course that assistance gives Western governments influence, and of course there are risks of escalation and economic dependence. But accepting American or European weapons doesn’t magically transform a Ukrainian defending their community into an American imperialist. People can pursue their own objectives while accepting assistance from governments with very different motivations. It’s happened throughout history and really shouldn’t be a difficult concept to grasp.
Ukrainian and Russian socialists have been making these arguments since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, although their contributions seem to attract considerably less attention in certain Western leftist circles than another opportunity to quote dead soviets to each other. I’ve personally shared countless articles and statements by Ukrainian and Russian leftists, along with anarchists and socialists from across Central and Eastern Europe, with people advocating revolutionary defeatism. The responses are depressingly predictable. They ridicule the authors, refuse to read what they’ve written, or retreat to the convenient observation that “the left isn’t a monolith.” Well, no shit. Nobody suggested otherwise. The point is that people with direct experience of Russian occupation are making arguments that deserve serious consideration, especially when those arguments challenge the assumptions of Western leftists who’ve decided they already understand the conflict perfectly well because they’ve done enough scrolling and tiny-microphone-ranting.
They’re happy to invoke international working-class solidarity right up until workers from Ukraine, Russia, or elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe have the audacity to disagree with them. Then suddenly their experiences are irrelevant, their political judgment is suspect, and their arguments aren’t even worth reading. It’s an impressive display of intellectual arrogance from people who spend so much time complaining about Western imperialism while seemingly incapable of looking at the world from anywhere outside their own Western comfort bubble.
In 2022, the Russian Socialist Movement and Ukraine’s Sotsialnyi Rukh issued a joint statement challenging the characterization of the war as an inter-imperialist conflict. They argued that Russian imperialism cannot be understood exclusively through economic competition with the West because it also involves an expansionist conception of Russian national identity that denies the independent existence of Ukraine and Belarus. That seems like a rather important consideration when discussing a government whose president has spent years making historical arguments about why Ukraine shouldn’t exist as an independent political entity. Yet in some analyses, the Kremlin’s own imperial ambitions are left out entirely.
The Ukrainian socialist Taras Bilous offers a very useful perspective in a February 2026 interview (originally published in Jacobin), nearly four years after joining the Ukrainian army. Bilous is hardly an uncritical defender of his government or someone romanticizing the war. He discusses the exhaustion of Ukrainian soldiers, the failures of Ukrainian military and political leadership, and the growing recognition that a ceasefire may be necessary even if it leaves territory under Russian occupation. He also explains what the war has meant for Ukraine’s already fragile left. Experienced activists have been killed, others are serving in the military, and organizations attempting to rebuild have faced obstacles ranging from martial law to renewed far-right intimidation. He warns that a defeat could strengthen the far right while potentially destroying the organized left altogether, forcing another generation of Ukrainian socialists to start from scratch.
Now consider that warning alongside the confidence with which some Western leftists point to revolutionary defeatism. Bilous is considering whether Ukrainian socialists will still have the people and political space to organize after the war, while critics far removed from those consequences seem more interested in whether his decision to fight satisfies their ideological criteria, treating an existential war as an excellent occasion for a hypothetical debate club.
I support internationalist class struggle and would welcome independent workers’ councils capable of challenging the governments responsible for exploitation and war. But wishing those movements into existence doesn’t give them the organization, popular support, or military capacity to stop the Russian army. You can spend all day explaining that both governments serve capitalist interests, but workers living under Russian occupation will still have to contend with the security services, prisons, and political restrictions of the occupying state.
Ukrainian workers have every reason to challenge their own government’s labor policies, resist coercive mobilization, and fight over who controls their country’s reconstruction. But those struggles require some freedom to organize in the first place. As of July 2026, OVD-Info had documented at least 1,715 political prisoners in Russia, up from 997 a year ago. That should be a fairly ominous warning about what awaits Ukrainian leftists under permanent Russian occupation. So if you’re going to opt for revolutionary defeatism, explain who protects these people when Ukrainian defenses collapse and Russian forces permanently move in. Telling them that Kyiv and Moscow are both capitalist won’t keep a single organizer out of a Russian prison.
After years of this debate, I’ve had enough of people treating a century of revolutionary theory as a substitute for understanding the war they’re so eager to lecture everyone about, including people living through it. The sheer arrogance of demanding that Ukrainians gamble their homes, their political movements, and their lives on some hypothetical workers’ uprising is staggering, especially coming from people who continue to draw a false equivalence between the invading army and the population resisting it. These are people who can produce endless paragraphs about NATO expansion, Western hypocrisy, and the failures of Ukrainian capitalism, yet somehow have remarkably little to say about systematic Russian torture and weaponization of sexual violence, mass graves, forced deportations, abducted children, or the systematic repression of people living under occupation. And they have the audacity to lecture Ukrainians about what genuine liberation should look like.
They can congratulate themselves on their ideological consistency from the comfort of their homes while Ukrainian workers are left dealing with the consequences of a revolutionary strategy that exists almost entirely in their imaginations. If it fails, they won’t be the ones living under occupation. They’ll probably still be quoting Parenti, Rockhill, or some other revisionist frauds from their reading circles somewhere in the collective West while Ukrainian anarchists and socialists are sitting in Russian prisons or worse. If you want to prescribe revolutionary defeatism to people facing an invading army, then explain how your strategy is supposed to protect them.
And if you can’t even begin to answer that question, find yourself another fucking vanity project. Ukrainian workers have enough to deal with without being expected to sacrifice their lives so some Western leftist can enjoy the sound of their own voice reciting revolutionary theory they haven’t even figured out how to put into practice themselves.
radical dumpling: screaming into the void about anti-fascism and anti-imperial consistency, from somewhere between east and west.
This article first appeared on radical dumpling’s Substack.
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