Ideas of a specific form of ‘Muslim antisemitism’ carry the risk of unjustified blanket suspicion. Both antisemitism and anti-Muslim racism must be taken seriously, regardless who they come from.
Since 7 October 2023, we have once again been witnessing a lively debate on the causes, forms and extent of antisemitism in Germany. This is perhaps not surprising, given that Hamas’ attack on Israeli civilians and the ensuing war have also had dramatic repercussions here in Germany: In the first two months after the terrorist attack alone, the reporting centres of the Federal Association RIAS documented 994 antisemitic incidents, including three cases of extreme violence, 29 attacks, 32 threats and 72 targeted acts of vandalism.[1] The OFEK counselling centre for antisemitic violence and discrimination observed a twelvefold increase in requests for support in 2023 compared to 2022. Jews experience antisemitism at schools and universities, in their neighbourhoods, on public transport, at work and at demonstrations.[2]
There has also been an increase in antisemitic crimes: Since 7 October, the Federal Criminal Police Office has recorded around 2,300 antisemitic crimes in connection with the war in the Middle East – in particular damage to property and incitement to hatred – most of which are attributed to a ‘foreign’ or ‘religious ideology’ (as of April 2024).[3] RIAS acknowledges that perpetrators come from a number of different political backgrounds, but emphasises that ‘anti-Israel activism particularly dominates the incidents’. One in five incidents is attributed to this spectrum, with a further six per cent of cases having an Islamist background.[4]
The not-so-new ‘new antisemitism’
In recent months, media coverage and the debates it sparked have focused in particular on various forms of pro-Palestinian protest, most of which were attributed to people with a migrant background. Indeed, there have been numerous demonstrations and other actions at which antisemitic statements were made – and at which people with a Muslim migrant background were also present. The enthusiastic distribution of baklava on Sonnenallee in Berlin-Neukölln by the Palestinian Samidoun network on the evening of 7 October is just one prominent example.
Muslim communities quickly became the focus of attention and were sometimes subjected to generalised suspicion. A few weeks after the Hamas attack, Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck explicitly called on ‘Muslims living here’ to ‘clearly distance themselves from antisemitism so as not to undermine their own claim to tolerance’.[5] This generalisation was particularly evident in the reporting on Muslim schoolchildren, some of whom were accused of holding Islamist and antisemitic views. Two weeks after the Hamas attack, the Bild newspaper addressed ‘hatred of Israel in German schools’ and, quoting the president of the teachers’ association Stefan Düll, quickly identified the culprits in its headline: ‘School classes in which almost all the pupils are Muslims’.[6] The Bonn-based General-Anzeiger, which dealt with the allegedly Islamist attitudes of pupils, asked whether an ‘Islamisation’ of schools could currently be observed.[7] Most recently, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung generalised that there was a ‘bloody culture war over schools’ after Jewish pupils had been victims of bullying.[8] The recurring message of these texts: Islam is to blame.
However, the topics and subjects of the debate are merely a continuation of a discussion that has been ongoing since the beginning of the millennium under the banner of ‘the new antisemitism,’ which focuses on hostility towards Jews among people of Muslim or Arab background, both in their countries of origin and in Western Europe and Germany. This has been fuelled by a variety of factors, including the following three: firstly, anti-Israel demonstrations and attacks, which have also been occurring in Germany since 2000; secondly, the increase in Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe, for which the self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ was largely responsible; and thirdly, Muslim migration to European countries.
In reporting on the consequences of migration, the polemical term ‘imported antisemitism’ has sometimes been used, conveniently externalising the problem and distracting attention from widespread antisemitism among ‘long-established residents’. Furthermore, the term misrepresents the origins and semantics of modern antisemitism, which was shaped in all its central aspects by European actors in the 19th and 20th centuries. One need only recall the long ‘success story’ of the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ conspiracy theory, to which Hamas also referred in its first charter of 1987. Furthermore, the term ignores the fact that Germany is a (post-)migration society: around a third of the people living here have a migrant background. The more than five million Muslims are an integral part of this society. As in all social groups, antisemitism also exists among the descendants of immigrants and religious minorities – but that does not mean it is ‘imported’.
Islamised antisemitism
In order to understand the general and specific aspects of antisemitism in the context of migration, it is necessary to consider phenomena of hostility towards Jews in a multidimensional way. For over twenty years, there has been controversy in both political and academic debate about the appropriate terminology, as well as ongoing differences in the assessment of the historical origins and spread of the phenomenon.
The idea of a specifically ‘Muslim antisemitism’ risks associating a great many very different people with hostility towards Jews – Sunnis and Shiites, atheists and Islamists, Egyptians and Indonesians. This kind of generalisation is repeatedly evident in public discourse about ‘the antisemitism of the others’.[12] Nevertheless, the term ‘Muslim antisemitism’ allows us to refer to religious factors that do indeed exist.[13] The term ‘Arab antisemitism’ is also not free of generalisations, but it can capture region-specific ideological influences, such as Arab nationalism or pan-Arabism. At the same time, it locates prejudices and worldviews not exclusively in religion, but also in state propaganda, which is usually nationalistically oriented.
The term ‘Islamised antisemitism’ seems particularly appropriate.[14] In contrast to the term ‘Islamic antisemitism’, used by the scholar of Islam Abdel-Hakim Ourghi, among others,[15] it clearly signals that narratives are the result of ongoing processes of construction. In this case, central narratives of modern antisemitism are linked back to Islamic tradition and its sources. The foundations for this were laid by the Egyptian intellectual Sayyid Qutb as early as the 1950s with his text ‘Our Struggle with the Jews’.[16] In it, he combined elements of European antisemitism, in particular the construct of the ‘Jewish world conspiracy,’ with narratives from the Qur’an. This synthesis resulted in the powerful narrative of the ‘Jewish conspirator’ who has threatened Islam and Muslims throughout history.
This shows that antisemitism developed into a ‘flexible code’ in the 20th century, making it possible to combine narratives from different religious and cultural contexts.[17] The results can apparently be easily embedded into other religious or political contexts. These are therefore antisemitic narratives that draw on several sources, each with different historical contexts. Antisemitic narratives are therefore dynamic rather than static; they adapt to the circumstances of the time. Monothematic explanations that assign a central role to religion fail to recognise this fact and lead to undifferentiated views. These can certainly take on a racist dimension, as they are accompanied by sweeping generalisations.
Current data
It is empirically indisputable that antisemitic prejudices exist among people who identify as Muslims, in Germany and globally.[18] Recently, political scientist Jannik M.K. Fischer and criminologist Peter Wetzels found ‘significantly increased rates of antisemitic attitudes’ among Muslims in Germany based on three representative surveys. The results show “that since 2021, there has been a linear trend of increasing overt antisemitic attitudes among Muslims, reaching a provisional peak of 17% in 2023. At the same time, however, this also shows that overt antisemitic attitudes are currently only found among a minority of the overall group of Muslims in Germany.”[19)
But what factors lead to antisemitic attitudes – are they really directly related to Islam? A recent study on antisemitism at German universities by sociologists Thomas Hinz, Anna Marczuk and Frank Multrus suggests that religion – in this case Islam – is hardly the sole contributing factor. With regard to the Muslim respondents, the authors note: ‘Muslim students display antisemitic attitudes more frequently than Christian or non-denominational students, which is partly related to their own and their family’s origins in a country bordering the conflict region. However, students of the Christian faith also support antisemitic attitudes more frequently if their parents come from such a country.’[20]
This shows that the perception and interpretation of the conflict in the Middle East are not necessarily linked to religious affiliation. This finding is consistent with numerous results of studies from recent years.[21] These also point out that self-identification as ‘(strongly) religious’ is not necessarily decisive for the strength of antisemitic attitudes, but rather the respective interpretation of religion: dogmatic-fundamentalist or traditional-conservative religious attitudes in particular favour hostility towards Jews.[22] Furthermore, according to the 2019 Berlin Monitor, Muslims who harbour antisemitic sentiments do not differ ‘in terms of their values and attitudes’ from ‘conservative and authoritarian circles of the [non-Muslim] German population’. Antisemitism is therefore more an effect of conservative-authoritarian attitudes than of religion.
Anti-Muslim racism
The data described illustrates the clear threat potential and the ongoing presence of antisemitism since 7 October in various milieus, including among Muslims. The debate on this issue is socially charged and oscillates between trivialisation on the one hand and generalisation on the other. The latter may be one of the reasons why anti-Muslim racism has also increased in recent months. In the first seven weeks after the Hamas attack, the Alliance Against Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Racism CLAIM documented over 180 cases of violent anti-Muslim attacks, insults and threats – meaning that by November, the number of cases was already higher than in the previous year. Mosques throughout Germany received threatening letters filled with faeces and pork.[24] By the beginning of April 2024, the Federal Criminal Police Office had recorded anti-Muslim crimes related to the conflict in the Middle East ‘in the low three-digit range’.[25] People who are perceived as Muslim or Arab are increasingly reporting feelings of alienation and that racist blanket suspicions are directed at them.[26]
This development is part of a trend of racism towards Muslims or people perceived as such that has been widespread for years:[27] ‘With so many Muslims here, I sometimes feel like a stranger in my own country’ – 38 per cent of the population agreed with this statement in the 2022 ‘Leipzig Authoritarianism Study’. Almost a third of those surveyed also advocated a complete rejection of Muslim immigration.[28] According to the Bertelsmann Foundation’s ‘Religionsmonitor’, 52 per cent of the German population view Islam as (very or somewhat) threatening – far more than other religions.[29] This is also repeatedly evident in everyday life: Muslim people in particular often experience discrimination in government offices or in contact with authorities.[30]
Even ostensible criticism of antisemitism can be a vehicle for discriminatory prejudices against Muslims. In some cases, it is clear that the issue of antisemitism is being exploited. In April 2024, for example, the Thuringian AfD chairman Björn Höcke claimed in a television debate with CDU politician Mario Voigt that he saw ‘no significant antisemitism among the original German population’. Rather, antisemitism was ‘once again a problem that we have brought upon ourselves with migration into the country: millions of immigrants from an Islamic context, the Islamisation of Germany and Europe’.[31] Yet antisemitism is particularly prevalent among AfD voters.[32]
This narrowing and linking of the issues of antisemitism and migration policy is not limited to court-confirmed fascists such as Höcke. In November 2023, for example, CSU leader Markus Söder called for consistent deportations in response to antisemitic acts by (post-)migrants and a ‘fundamental reorganisation of migration policy’. [33]
Beyond trivialisation and generalisation
The current debates in media, civil society, academia and politics are often accompanied by sweeping generalisations. The concerns and fears of those affected – Jews and Muslims – are being exploited for other purposes.
The main players are extremists, primarily from the Islamist and right-wing extremist camps. In the Islamist camp, the various channels of the transnational Hizb ut-Tahrir movement can be cited here. Its propagandists never tire of portraying Muslims as victims of anti-Muslim policies that are allegedly observable worldwide. Antisemitic groups are also gaining support because experiences of discrimination can often lead to an increased need to identify with a ‘home group’ with religious or ethnic connotations. This, in turn, can lead to greater separation from supposed ‘out-groups,’ including Jews. ‘Experiences of marginalisation play into the hands of Islamist groups’ victimisation discourses,’ political scientists Cemal Öztürk and Susanne Pickel and sociologist Gert Pickel recently stated.[35] Experiences of racism are certainly not the cause of antisemitism. But seriously addressing anti-Muslim racism is also important in terms of combating antisemitism and preventing extremism.
On the far right there are actors who link a variety of social problems monocausally to migration and Islam. However, prejudices such as anti-Muslim racism and antisemitism occur ‘together, with a high statistical probability,’ according to the findings of the 2023 ‘Mitte Study.’[36] This is evident in large sections of the population, but is particularly clear on the far right. The integral intertwining of these ideologies is particularly evident in the conspiracy narrative of the ‘Great Replacement’.[37]
Current work by the RIRA (Radical Islam versus Radical Anti-Islam) research network shows that social polarisation and perceived threats can lead to a spiral of reciprocal radicalisation that can cause massive damage to social cohesion.[38] We therefore need contributions to the debate that address the existing problems in an appropriate and solution-oriented manner. This also means that uncomfortable opinions and findings from the other side should not be met with inappropriate and harmful accusations. Antisemitism and anti-Muslim racism must be taken seriously – regardless of who is responsible for them and without falling into a competition over victimhood.
Footnotes
[1] See Bundesverband der Recherche- und Informationsstellen Antisemitismus (RIAS) e.V., Antisemitische Reaktionen auf den 7. Oktober, Berlin 2023, p. 3.
[2] See OFEK e.V. – Beratungsstelle bei antisemitischer Gewalt und Diskriminierung, Terror und Krieg gegen Israel, antisemitische Anfeindungen in Deutschland: OFEK verzeichnet ein immenses Beratungsaufkommen, Pressemitteilung, 6 November 2023, https://ofek-beratung.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/OFEK-Pressemitteilung-Ein-Monat-nach-Angriffen-auf-Israel.pdf.
[3] See Mediendienst Integration, Antisemitismus, Zahl antisemitischer Straftaten, April 2024, https://mediendienst-integration.de/desintegration/Antisemitismus.html.
[4] See RIAS (Anm. 1), p. 6, quote p. 24.
[5] Vizekanzler und Bundesminister Robert Habeck, Rede zu Israel und Antisemitismus, 1 November 2023, http://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/M-O/manuskripte-habeck-ueber-israel-und-Antisemitismus-de.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4, p 2. For corresponding generalisations, see also Saba-Nur Cheema, Nicht jeder, der die Palästinaflagge hält, ist gleich Antisemit, 21 October 2023, http://www.spiegel.de/a-2cbe6398-0aca-48e0-853e-a09fcc5d4895.
[6] “Schulklassen, in denen fast nur Muslime sitzen”, 22 October 2023, http://www.bild.de/-85832188.
[7] Christian Schwerdtfeger, Lehrer: Muslimische Schüler werden immer konservativer, 12 January 2024, https://ga.de/104924255.
[8] Lucien Scherrer, Wer den Schülern Gemälde mit nackten Frauen zeigt, riskiert sein Leben – Probleme mit Islamisten sind in Frankreich ausser Kontrolle. In der Schweiz sollte das eine Warnung sein, 10 April 2024, http://www.nzz.ch/-ld.1824897.
[9] See Christian Heilbronn/Doron Rabinovici/Natan Sznaider (eds.), Neuer Antisemitismus? Fortsetzung einer globalen Debatte, Berlin 2019.
[10] The arson attack on the Düsseldorf synagogue on 2 October 2000 was the first attack on a Jewish institution in Germany allegedly carried out by Muslim perpetrators – supposedly in protest against Israel’s actions against the second Intifada. See Bewährungsstrafe für Attentat auf Synagoge, 7 March 2001, http://www.faz.net/-116797.html.
[11] See Daniel J. Schroeter, “Islamic Anti-Semitism” in Historical Discourse, in: American Historical Review 4/2018, pp. 1172–1189; Esther Webman, The Challenge of Assessing Arab/Islamic Antisemitism, in: Middle Eastern Studies 5/2010, pp. 677–697.
[12] See Sina Arnold, Der neue Antisemitismus der Anderen? Islam, Migration und Flucht, in: Heilbronn/Rabinovici/Sznaider (note 9), p. 128–158.
[13] However, the religious roots of antisemitism in Islam are not nearly as deep as in Christianity (accusation of deicide), which is evident in both Christian theology and the practice of persecution.
[14] See Michael Kiefer, Islamischer, islamistischer oder islamisierter Antisemitismus, in: Die Welt des Islams 3/2006, pp. 277–306; Michael Kiefer, Antisemitismus und Migration, Berlin 2017, http://www.schule-ohne-rassismus.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Baustein-5-Antisemitismus-Migration-web.pdf.
[15] See Abdel-Hakim Ourghi, Die Juden im Koran. Ein Zerrbild mit fatalen Folgen, München 2023.
[16] See Sayyid Qutb, Maʿrakatunā maʿa l-Yahūd, Jeddah 1970 (Partial English translation in: Ronald L. Nettler, Past Trials and Present Tribulations. A Muslim Fundamentalist’s View of the Jews, Oxford 1987).
[17] See Thomas Haury, Zur Logik des bundesdeutschen Antizionismus, in: Léon Poliakov, Vom Antizionismus zum Antisemitismus, Freiburg/Br. 1992, pp. 125–159, here p. 128.
[18] See American Jewish Committee Berlin, Antisemitismus in Deutschland, 10.5.2022, https://ajcgermany.org/de/broschuere/Antisemitismus-deutschland-eine-repraesentativbefragung; Anti-Defamation League, ADL Global 100, 2014, https://global100.adl.org/map/meast; Sina Arnold, Antisemitismus unter Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund und Muslim*innen, April 2023, https://mediendienst-integration.de/fileadmin/Dateien/MEDIENDIENST-Expertise_Antisemitismus_unter_Menschen_mit_Migrationshintergrund_und_Muslimen.pdf.
[19] Jannik M.K. Fischer/Peter Wetzels, Die Verbreitung antisemitischer Einstellungen in Deutschland, in: Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik, 3 April 2024, https://doi.org/10.1007/s41682-024-00167-6, p. 1, p. 27.
[20] Thomas Hinz/Anna Marczuk/Frank Multrus, Studentisches Meinungsklima zur Gewalteskalation in Israel und Gaza und Antisemitismus an deutschen Hochschulen, Universität Konstanz, Exzellenzcluster “Die politische Dimension von Ungleichheit”, Working Paper 16/2024, p. 4.
[21] See David Andrew Weinberg/Anti-Defamation League, ADL’s Global 100 Survey: What Does It Actually Say about Muslim Attitudes toward Jews?, 9 September 2020, http://www.adl.org/resources/blog/adls-global-100-survey-what-does-it-actually-say-about-muslim-attitudes-toward-jews; Nils Friedrichs/Nora Storz, Antimuslimische und antisemitische Einstellungen im Einwanderungsland – (k)ein Einzelfall?, Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration, SVR-Studie 2/2022, http://www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/SVR-Studie-2022-2__Antimuslimische-und-antisemitische-Einstellungen_barrierefrei-8.pdf, pp. 38–41.
[22] See Cemal Öztürk/Gert Pickel, Der Antisemitismus der Anderen: Für eine differenzierte Betrachtung antisemitischer Einstellungen unter Muslim:innen in Deutschland, in: Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik 6/2022, pp. 189–231.
[23] See Gert Pickel et al., Der Berlin-Monitor 2019, Leipzig 2020, p. 62. See also Christian Babka von Gostomski, Facetten antisemitischer Einstellungen bei ausgewählten Migrantengruppen in Deutschland, in: Sonja Schulz et al. (eds.), (In)Toleranz in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft?, Wiesbaden 2021, pp. 199–240.
[24] See CLAIM – Allianz gegen Islam- und Muslimfeindlichkeit, Gewaltvolle Übergriffe, Drohungen, Diskriminierungen: Zahl antimuslimischer Vorfälle bundesweit erneut gestiegen, Press release, 4 December 2023, http://www.claim-allianz.de/aktuelles/news/pressemitteilung-gewaltvolle-uebergriffe-drohungen-diskriminierungen-zahl-antimuslimischer-vorfaelle-bundesweit-erneut-gestiegen.
[25] Mediendienst Integration, Rassismus, Antimuslimischer Rassismus, April 2024, Externer Link: https://mediendienst-integration.de/desintegration/rassismus.html.
[26] See Tülay Karakuş, “Seit ein paar Wochen fühle ich mich hier fremd”, 30 December 2023, http://www.zeit.de/zett/politik/2023-12/antimuslimischer-rassismus-nahostkonflikt-anstieg-deutschland.
[27] See Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Hrsg.), Muslimfeindlichkeit – Eine deutsche Bilanz. Bericht des Unabhängigen Expertenkreises Muslimfeindlichkeit, Berlin 2023, http://dx.doi.org/10.15496/publikation-89325, p. 45.
[28] See Susanne Pickel et al., Demokratie und politische Kultur, in: Oliver Decker et al. (Hrsg.), Autoritäre Dynamiken in unsicheren Zeiten, Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie 2022, Gießen 2022, pp. 185–208, here p. 194f.
[29] See Yasemin El-Menouar/Stephan Vopel, Religionsmonitor kompakt, Dezember 2023: Antisemitismus, Rassismus und gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt. Ein Blick auf Deutschland in Zeiten der Eskalation in Nahost, Gütersloh 2023, p. 9.
[30] See Deutsches Zentrum für Integrations- und Migrationsforschung, Rassismus und seine Symptome. Bericht des Nationalen Diskriminierungs- und Rassismusmonitors, Berlin 2023, p. 92.
[31] See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9vfnjeOmtLg#t=2m10s.
[32] See Julia Schuler et al., Rechtsextremismus, Gewaltbereitschaft, Antisemitismus und Verschwörungsmentalität: AfD-Wähler_innen weisen die höchste Zustimmung zu anti-demokratischen Aussagen auf, 25.2.2020, https://home.uni-leipzig.de/decker/wahlpraeferenz.pdf.
[33] See Anika Schlünz, Markus Söder: Migranten, die sich nicht integrieren, sollen deutschen Pass abgeben, 6 November 2023, http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/-li.2156032.
[34] See Öztürk/Pickel (note 22); Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration (note 21), pp. 44f.; Andreas Zick et al., Verbreitung von Antisemitismus in der deutschen Bevölkerung. Ergebnisse ausgewählter repräsentativer Umfragen, Bielefeld 2017, pp. 62ff. However, no significant correlation was found by von Gostomski (note 23).
[35] Cemal Öztürk/Susanne Pickel/Gert Pickel, Der islamisierte Antisemitismus: Aufgebauschtes Schreckgespenst oder bagatellisiertes Ressentiment?, 13 February 2024, https://blog.prif.org/2024/02/13/der-islamisierte-Antisemitismus-aufgebauschtes-schreckgespenst-oder-bagatellisiertes-ressentiment.
[36] Nico Mokros/Andreas Zick, Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit zwischen Krisen- und Konfliktbewältigung, in: Nico Mokros/Andreas Zick/Beate Küpper (eds.), Die distanzierte Mitte. Rechtsextreme und demokratiegefährdende Einstellungen in Deutschland 2022/23, Bonn 2023, pp. 149–180, here p. 152.
[37] See Andreas Önnerfors, Der Grosse Austausch. Conspiratorial Frames of Terrorist Violence in Germany, in: Andreas Önnerfors/André Krouwel (eds.), Europe: Continent of Conspiracies, London–New York 2021, pp. 76–96.[38] See https://projekt-rira.de/inhalt-des-projekts.
Sina Arnold holds a doctorate in social sciences and is a research associate at the Centre for Research on Antisemitism and the Research Institute for Social Cohesion at the Technical University of Berlin.
Michael Kiefer holds a doctorate in Islamic studies and is Professor of Social Work in the Migration Society with a focus on Muslim welfare at the University of Osnabrück.
The German original of this article first appeared in ‘Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte’. This English translation, by Daniel Mang, first appeared on the Left Renewal Blog.
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